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The computing paradigm witnessed a fundamental shift with the uprise of multi-core
systems. While pushing the power wall is the primary stimulus, several other conflicting
constraints play equally important roles in the design of a multi-core system. For exam-
ple, ensuring robustness and a secure operation are critical to the deployment of a high-
performance system. There are several components of a multi-core system that demand
distinct innovations to adhere to all the aforementioned design constraints. This disserta-
tion makes a radical contribution to the following three specific areas of a multi-core system
design. First, preserving a reliable operation of a network-on-chip (NoC) components in
the presence of a high power supply noise (PSN). The growing NoC power footprint, in-
crease in the transistor current, and high switching speed of the logic devices exacerbate
the peak PSN in the NoC power delivery network (PDN). Hence, preserving the power
supply integrity in the NoC PDN is critical. A collection of novel flow-control protocols and
an adaptive routing algorithm are proposed to mitigate the PSN in NoCs. Second, near-
threshold computing (NTC) paradigm is explored in the realm of general-purpose graphics
processing units (GPGPU). Two key factors can significantly undermine the efficacy of
GPGPUs at NTC: (a) elongated delays at NTC make the GPGPU applications severely
sensitive to multi-cycle latency datapaths (MLDs) within the GPGPU pipeline, and (b)
iv
process variation (PV) at NTC induces a substantial performance variance. To address
these emerging challenges, a dynamic circuit-architectural technique is proposed that can
dynamically adjust the degree of parallelization and the speed of the MLDs within each
stream core of a GPGPU. Third, an emerging security threat at NTC has been thoroughly
analyzed. The timing fault vulnerability of a circuit is shown to increase rapidly, as the
operating conditions of the transistor devices shift from traditional super-threshold to near-
threshold values. Exploiting this vulnerability, two novel threat models are proposed for
NTC that rely on malicious application software to induce timing fault attacks in the under-
lying NTC hardware. The efficacy of the threat models is evaluated with both simulations,
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Computer hardware researchers have perennially focussed on improving the perfor-
mance of computers while stipulating the energy consumption under a strict budget. While
several innovations over the years have led to high performance and energy efficient com-
puters, more challenges have also emerged as a fallout. For example, smaller transistor
devices in modern multi-core systems are afflicted with several reliability and security con-
cerns, which were inconceivable even a decade ago. Tackling these bottlenecks happens
to negatively impact the power and performance of the computers. This dissertation ex-
plores novel techniques to gracefully solve some of the pressing challenges of the modern
computer design. Specifically, the proposed techniques improve the reliability of on-chip
communication fabric under a high power supply noise, increase the energy-efficiency of
low-power graphics processing units, and demonstrate an unprecedented security loophole
of the low-power computing paradigm through rigorous hardware-based experiments.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of multi-core devices has significantly increased the design complexity
of modern computing systems. Such complexity stems from several conflicting, first-order
design constraints. For example, ensuring a high system performance under a tight power
budget requires a careful cross-layer design, spanning device, circuit, and architecture lay-
ers. Moreover, with ever-shrinking transistor features, integrating more devices on a chip
has started to raise several reliability concerns in contemporary technology nodes. As a
result, maintaining a functionally correct execution at the component-level can potentially
undermine the system-level energy efficiency. While low-power system design can address
some of these challenges, it is plagued from an inherent security vulnerability due to a
low-voltage operation of the transistor devices. This dissertation aims to tackle some of the
critical challenges in attaining reliable, energy-efficient, and secure multi-core systems.
One of the major sources of reliability challenges in modern computers is Power Supply
Noise (PSN). PSN can cause a sporadic droop in the supply voltage, radically degrading the
delay of various on-chip circuit components. A direct impact of PSN is timing errors, where
the delay of a pipe stage computation exceeds the clock period. Network-on-Chip (NoC)—
the emerging de-facto standard for on-chip communication platform [1, 2]—faces unique
challenges from PSN, primarily due to the simultaneous switching of transistor devices in
lower technology nodes. This dissertation proposes novel proactive approaches, including a
slew of flow-control protocols and an adaptive routing algorithm, to mitigate the peak PSN
in NoCs, while incurring a minimal performance loss.
Near-Threshold Computing (NTC) is emerging as one of the promising low power com-
puting platforms, promoting an energy-efficient system design [3–5]. An NTC device sets its
supply voltage close to its threshold voltage, dramatically reducing the energy consumption.
However, the reduced operating voltage at NTC also leads to a significant performance loss
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in a uni-core processor. In order to maintain the traditional super-threshold computing
(STC) performance at NTC, application parallelism can be exploited, thus making GPUs
an excellent platform for reaping the benefits of NTC. This dissertation explores several
predicaments of the NTC operation of a GPU, and proposes a holistic circuit-architectural
solution to promote an energy-efficient NTC execution of general-purpose GPU applications.
Moving from the traditional STC to NTC alters many of the device characteristics,
jeopardizing trustworthy computing. For example, a slight variation in the supply voltage
impacts the circuit delay characteristics significantly, enabling copious security loopholes at
NTC [3]. While many recent works have explored challenges and opportunities of reliable
computing at NTC, the security vulnerabilities spawning from such low power computing
frameworks have received only marginal attention. This dissertation establishes a platform
to reason about trustworthy computing on a system built with circuits and devices operating
at the near-threshold regime.
1.1 Contributions of This Dissertation
The works presented in this dissertation have been published in several conference
proceedings and journal articles, including 2016 IEEE/ACM Design, Automation and Test
in Europe (DATE), 2016 IEEE/ACM Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2017 IEEE
Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration Systems (TVLSI), 2018 IEEE Embedded
Systems Letters (ESL), and 2018 IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing
(TETC). Details of the publications are listed below:
1.1.1 Conference Papers
• SwiftGPU: Fostering Energy Efficiency in a Near-Threshold GPU Through a Tactical
Performance Boost. Prabal Basu, Hu Chen, Shamik Saha, Koushik Chakraborty and
Sanghamitra Roy. IEEE/ACM Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2016.
• PRADA: Combating Voltage Noise in the NoC Power Supply Through Flow-Control
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and Routing Algorithms. Prabal Basu, Rajesh JS, Koushik Chakraborty and Sang-
hamitra Roy. IEEE/ACM Design Automation and Test in Europe (DATE), 2016.
1.1.2 Journal Papers
• TITAN: Uncovering the Paradigm Shift in Security Vulnerability at Near-Threshold
Computing. Prabal Basu, Pramesh Pandey, Aatreyi Bal, Chidhambaranathan Ra-
jamanikkam, Koushik Chakraborty and Sanghamitra Roy. IEEE Transactions on
Emerging Topics in Computing (TETC), vol. 1, pp. 1-1, 2018.
• FIFA: Exploring a Focally Induced Fault Attack Strategy in Near-Threshold Com-
puting. Prabal Basu, Chidhambaranathan Rajamanikkam, Aatreyi Bal, Pramesh
Pandey, Trevor Carter, Koushik Chakraborty and Sanghamitra Roy. IEEE Embedded
Systems Letters (ESL), vol. 10, issue. 4, pp. 115-118, 2018.
• IcoNoClast: Tackling Voltage Noise in the NoC Power Supply Through Flow-Control
and Routing Algorithms. Prabal Basu, Rajesh Jayashankara Shridevi, Koushik Chakraborty
and Sanghamitra Roy. IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration Systems
(TVLSI), vol. 25, issue 7, pp. 2035-2044, 2017.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter presents an extensive literature survey on the existing research efforts
that are related to this dissertation. The pertinent works include analysis and mitigation of
PSN in various system-on-chip (SoC) components, circuit and architecture-level techniques
that improve the performance and energy-efficiency of general purpose GPUs, and security
vulnerabilities in low-power devices. In order to systematically study the important works
in these areas, this chapter is organized in the following sections. Section 2.1 discusses
the works on PSN mitigation strategies, Section 2.2 describes several existing optimization
techniques to improve the power-performance of GPUs, and Section 2.3 outlines the state-
of-the-art works on diverse hardware security attacks and their countermeasures.
2.1 Study of PSN in SoC Components
Several previous research efforts study the significance of PSN on the chip power per-
formance. The combined effect of the aggravating transient current and accelerated on-chip
component density has raised severe reliability concerns. Work related to reducing peak
voltage noise can be categorized in three domains: 1) characterizing and mitigating PSN in
microprocessors (Section 2.1.1); 2) understanding voltage noise in NoC (Section 2.1.2); and
3) flow-control and routing techniques in the NoC (Section 2.1.3).
2.1.1 Characterizing and Mitigating Peak Noise in Microprocessors
• VRSync [6]: The effects of chip-wide activity fluctuation, caused by global syn-
chronization in multi-threaded applications, can overwhelm the effects of core-level
workload variability. Based on this observation, Miller et al. developed a methodology
that uses emergency-aware scheduling policies to reduce the slope of load fluctuations,
eliminating voltage emergencies.
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• Orchestrator [7]: Xing et al. observed that multiple threads sharing the same
function body exhibit similar power activity. As a result, voltage emergencies can
be mitigated intelligently by relocating the threads among the cores. Their proposed
technique Orchestrator maximally leverages thread diversity based on inter-core volt-
age interaction, thus obviating voltage droop synergy among cores.
• Sharma et al. [8]: Voltage emergencies are correlated with specific microarchi-
tectural event like cache misses. The authors of this work proposed an event-guided
dynamic technique that triggers a droop-avoidance mechanism when emergency-prone
events recurs.
None of these works explore the impact of interconnect fabric (NoC) on power supply
noise. With the growing power footprint of NoC in a multi-core system, reduction of peak
supply noise in NoCs is critical for reliable and energy-efficient computing.
2.1.2 Understanding Voltage Noise in NoCs
• Nostrum [9]: Penolaazi and Jantsch’s high level power model for the Nostrum NoC
was one of the earliest efforts to develop an empirical function to accurately estimate
power fluctuations for an NoC load. A system simulation with their power model can
run up to 500 times faster than with Synopsys Power Compiler for a 4X4 NoC.
• Dahir et al. [10]: The authors developed a tool for measuring the voltage drop in
NoC routers due to communication workloads. The tool comprises an NoC simulator,
a fast power grid model, an on-chip link model, and a microarchitectural power model
for the routers. The model used in the tool has a mean relative error of 4.7% with
respect to SPICE simulation.
• Dahir et al. [11]: A novel application to core mapping strategy was proposed to cre-
ate a balanced activity distribution across the whole chip. Consequently, a significant
reduction in power supply noise was obtained with minimal energy overhead.
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Contrary to the aforementioned works, this dissertation explores proactive, architec-
tural techniques in NoCs to lower the peak voltage noise due to NoC activity.
2.1.3 Flow-control and Routing Techniques:
• Elastic Buffer [12]: In order to reduce the area and power footprints, Michelogian-
nakis et al. developed an elastic buffer (EB) flow control which adds simple control
logic in the channels to use pipeline flip-flops as EBs with two storage locations. This,
in turn, improved the throughput of the network.
• Kang et al. [13]: A fault-tolerant flow-control protocol is proposed to tackle soft-
errors in NoCs. The flow-control protocol recovers errors by the flit re-transmission
that ensures an error-free transmission on a flit-basis with dynamic packet fragmen-
tation. 97% error coverage was obtained with the use of the proposed technique.
• CATRA [14]: A congestion aware routing algorithm was proposed by utilizing both
local and non-local network information thus choosing the optimal path for forward-
ing a packet. A history based congestion detection metric was used along with a
distributed propagation system to ensure an accurate and efficient estimation of the
on-chip packet congestion.
• Fick et al. [15]: A fault-tolerant routing algorithm was proposed for 2D-mesh and
2D-torus networks that overcomes a large number of faults in a fine-grained fault
model, offering an astounding 99.99% reliability, on an average.
Unlike these works, this dissertation explores the use of flow-control and routing algo-
rithms in peak noise mitigation in NoC while improving the NoC energy efficiency.
2.2 Improving GPU Energy-efficiency
Several existing works that aim at increasing the GPU energy efficiency at the super-
threshold region, can be broadly classified into two categories: 1) throttling the hardware
to save energy; and 2) refining thread-scheduling and using novel memory design techniques
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to increase the utilization of GPUs. On the other hand, several works have delved into the
principles of the near-threshold region, as well as, its opportunity in micro-architecture.
2.2.1 Hardware Throttling Mechanism to Improve GPU Energy-efficiency
• Wang et al. [16]: The authors proposed a run-time power gating technique for GPU
caches to save leakage energy. The L1 and L2 caches go to a low-leakage sleep mode
when there is no ready thread and no memory request, respectively. This policy is
architecturally invisible and incurs a minimal overhead while achieving 54% energy
saving, on an average, for several CUDA benchmarks.
• Lee et al. [17]: The work demonstrated that, under a power envelope, adjusting the
number of GPU cores and the voltage/frequency of cores and/or on-chip intercon-
nects/caches can improve the throughput. Moreover, dynamically scaling the number
of operating cores and the voltages/frequencies of both cores and on-chip intercon-
nects/caches at runtime can further improve the throughput of GPU applications.
• GreenGPU [18]: The authors proposed an energy management framework for GPU-
CPU heterogeneous architectures. The proposed strategy dynamically distributes the
workloads to GPU and CPU so as to ensure that both the devices can finish their
executions approximately at the same time. Consequently, the energy consumption for
idling and waiting for the slower device to finish its execution is reduced significantly.
Furthermore, based on the utilizations of the CPU and GPU, the respective core
frequency and voltage are adjusted to save energy.
2.2.2 Improving GPU Utilization
• Narasiman et al. [19]: The authors claimed that the GPU resources are grossly
under-utilized. They suggested a large-warp micro-architecture to alleviate the per-
formance degradation due to branch divergence. Also, a two-level warp scheduling
was proposed to prevent all warps from stalling together.
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• Wang et al. [20]: Exploiting a close cooperation between compiler-directed data
placement and hardware-assisted runtime adaptation, this work uses a phase change
memory based hybrid memory design, to improve the utilization of the GPUs.
2.2.3 Challenges and Opportunities of NTC
• Pinckney et al. [21]: This work explored how the cessation of Dennard scaling
can be tackled by a near-threshold voltage operation of a chip multiprocessor while
utilizing the inherent Parallelism of the applications. Considering the parallelization
overhead, an NTC operation provides 4X improvement in the chip multiprocessor
performance across 6 commercial technology nodes.
• Dreslinski et al. [3]: Several key challenges of the NTC operation of a circuit are
discussed. For example, 10X performance loss, 5X increase in performance variation,
and 5 orders of magnitude increase in functional failure rate of memory, all with respect
to traditional super-threshold operation. Additionally, several cross-layer solutions are
proposed to gracefully tackle these problems, leading to an improved energy-efficient
operation of NTC circuits and systems.
• Marković et al. [5]: The realm of the NTC operation of a circuit was explored
with variations in supply voltage and transistor sizing. The authors introduced a
pass-transistor based logic family with only sub-threshold leakage while operating at
the near-threshold region. Finally, the use of ultra-low power design technique was
demonstrated in the chip synthesis methodology.
• Hsu et al. [22]: The authors proposed a reconfigurable single instruction multiple
data vector permutation engine that can work at the NTC region while tolerating
process variation. The register file circuit optimizations for ultra-low voltage operation
enabled robust functionality measured down to 280mV consuming 109 micro-watt at
16.8MHz, with peak energy efficiency of 154GOPS/W (9X higher than nominal).
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Compared to the aforementioned research efforts, this dissertation explores the chal-
lenges and performance/energy benefits of near-threshold execution of GPUs.
2.3 Study of Hardware-oriented Security Vulnerability
Works on hardware security most relevant to this dissertation can be categorized as
1) fault attacks (Section 2.3.1), 2) side-channel attacks (Section 2.3.2), 3) hardware trojan
attacks (Section 2.3.3), and 4) security threats in low-power systems (Section 2.3.4).
2.3.1 Fault Attacks
Fault Attacks (FA) leak secure and confidential information by inducing faults into
the circuits’ computations, or by modifying the circuit environment in order to change its
expected behavior. Some of the popular means of FAs are chip undervolting, overclocking,
electromagnetic pulse, laser beam and high temperature. Researchers have broadly sub-
categorized FAs into safe error, algorithm modification and differential fault analysis (DFA).
Safe error attacks distinguish between normal and abnormal behaviors of the chip to retrieve
sensitive information [23]. Balasch et al. exemplified algorithm modification, by replacing
the instructions executed by a microcontroller [24]. On the other hand, DFA extracts the
cryptographic keys by comparing the original and faulty ciphertexts [25]. Recently, Chong
Kim improvised the DFA on AES key schedule [26]. Tangil et al. proposed Alterdroid, a
DFA of obfuscated smartphone malware [27]. Sakiyama et al. presented an information-
theoretic mechanism for an optimal DFA [28]. Zussa et al. thoroughly investigated timing
constraints violations to achieve fault injection [29]. Mukherjee et al. [30] and Yuce et al. [31]
estimated the vulnerabilities of hardware cryptosystems, and proposed some metrics to
accurately measure the vulnerability from fault attacks. This dissertation demonstrates the
aggravated security threats of the low-power circuits, using rigorous hardware experiments.
2.3.2 Side-channel Attacks
Side channel attacks (SCA) exploit the information leakage from the physical imple-
mentation of a cryptographic hardware, for example, electromagnetic emission, power con-
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sumption and computation time. Kocher et al. were the early pioneers of side channel
analysis who demonstrated a strong correlation between the power consumption measure-
ments, and the cryptographic operations [32]. Basin et al. combined the side-channel
analysis with an information theoretic model, to quantify the information revealed to an
attacker [33]. While Liu et al. presented the efficacy of the SCA in last-level caches [34],
Wang et al. proposed new cache design paradigm to counter such cache-based SCA [35].
Hund et al. demonstrated the potency of SCA against the memory management system,
to gain privileged address space information [36]. Luo et al. recently analyzed the SCA
vulnerabilities of the GPUs, in the context of secure cryptographic implementation [37].
Although, the research in SCA has matured over the last decade, this dissertation is the
first work exploring the exclusive security threats at the near-threshold regime.
2.3.3 Hardware Trojan Attacks
Malicious modification of electronic circuits, also known as the Hardware Trojan, is
a well researched area in hardware security. Tehranipor et al. were one of the first to
systematically classify various hardware trojans [38]. Using a cryptanalysis based IC finger-
printing methodology, Agarwal et al. proposed a trojan detection mechanism [39]. Bhunia
et al. thoroughly analyzed the threats from hardware trojan attacks, presented different
attack models, and proposed various forms of protection approaches [40]. Among the more
recent works, Salmani et al. improved the trojan activation time, using a dummy scan
flip-flop insertion method [41]. Narasiman et al. improved the detection sensitivity of small
trojans with a side channel analysis [42]. Exploiting post-silicon multimodal thermal and
power characterization techniques, Hu et al. proposed an accurate trojan detection mech-
anism [43]. The proposed threat models in this dissertation assume a trojan free trusted
hardware, while exploiting an artifact in the hardware layer.
2.3.4 Security Threats in Low-power Systems
Researchers have explored the security vulnerabilities of low-power systems, for exam-
ple, sensor networks [44, 45], and implantable medical devices [46, 47], most of which are
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evident due to the unencrypted wireless interfaces in the communication level. The mitiga-
tion is centered around developing resource constrained encryption techniques and security
protocols [45,48]. However, the circuit/microarchitectural security vulnerabilities that may
arise due to the low-power operation of these systems, have not been explored. This disser-
tation focuses on uncovering such hardware level vulnerabilities for the low-power devices,
and proposes novel threat models that exploit the vulnerabilities to inflict end-user harms.
CHAPTER 3
TACKLING VOLTAGE NOISE IN THE NOC POWER SUPPLY THROUGH
FLOW-CONTROL AND ROUTING ALGORITHMS
3.1 Background and Contributions of This Work
Supply voltage integrity is a growing concern in modern multiprocessor system-on-
chips (MPSoCs). The varying current demand due to the simultaneous switching of the
logic devices, creates a noise in the power delivery network (PDN), resulting in a drop in
the effective supply voltage. This power supply noise (PSN) has a detrimental effect on the
performance, reliability and energy efficiency of various system components. Unfortunately,
with the shrinking technology nodes, this problem is poised to grow significantly due to
the decreasing feature size, high device density and interaction among many connected
components. As current and upcoming MPSoCs are embracing Network-on-Chips (NoCs)
as their de-facto standard for on-chip communication, PSN will negatively impact fault-free
communication on them.
Modern day NoCs can consume a significant fraction of the total chip power (∼36% in
the 80-tile TeraFLOPS at 65-nm [1]). Moreover, researchers are dedicating an independent
power-grid network for the NoC to enable efficient power management [49]. Consequently,
conventional techniques (e.g., [6, 8]) to tackle the PSN in cores have little impact on the
noise in an NoC PDN. Collectively, these trends make it imperative to control the PSN in
an NoC PDN, to ensure fault free and energy efficient communication.
In this chapter, a strong correlation between traffic patterns and the peak PSN in the
NoC is established. Using a rigorous cross-layer analysis, it is demonstrated that simul-
taneous and sudden rise in traffic loads within proximal regions in an NoC can lead to a
significant voltage noise. Subsequently, it is shown that existing NoC flow-control protocols
and congestion aware routing algorithms are unable to mitigate the PSN problem effectively.
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For example, a representative congestion aware routing scheme, called Destination-Based
Adapting Routing (DBAR [50]), shows negligible 0.1-1% average PSN improvements in real
workloads, over a deterministic dimension order routing.
Guided by this cross-layer insight, a combination of static design time and low-complexity
runtime approaches are explored that can efficiently mitigate voltage noise in an NoC PDN.
The proposed flow-control protocol intermittently allows high and low flit receptions within
a single NoC component, while systematically applying a hierarchical approach for scala-
bility. To further improve voltage noise characteristics, a flow-control cognizant adaptive
routing is explored, that proactively disperses the flit routes. Collectively, the proposed
mechanisms incur marginal circuit level implementation overheads, while promoting energy
efficient communication over the NoC by dampening voltage noise on its PDN.
The specific contributions in this chapter are discussed next.
3.1.1 Contributions
• The trends in interconnect circuit parameters and their impact on the peak PSN in
NoCs are presented (Section 3.2.4 and 3.2.4).
• The correlation between the peak PSN and the NoC router activity is analyzed (Sec-
tion 3.2.4).
• It is shown that congestion aware routing algorithms are ineffective in mitigating the
peak PSN (Section 3.5.2).
• A couple of runtime solutions, collectively referred to as IcoNoClast, are proposed to
mitigate PSN in NoCs. IcoNoClast comprises a novel PSN-Aware Flow-control (PAF)
protocol and an adaptive PSN-Aware Routing (PAR) algorithm (Section 3.3).
• The best scheme of IcoNoClast can reduce the regional peak PSN by ∼15% and
improve the energy efficiency by ∼12% compared to a representative routing scheme




In this section, the impact of power supply noise in NoCs is discussed. Section 3.2.1
discusses the components of supply noise, Section 3.2.2 briefly outlines the supply noise es-
timation methodology, Section 3.2.3 demonstrates the inefficacy of the core noise mitigation
techniques in reducing the NoC PSN, Section 3.2.4 presents the PSN trends, and finally
Section 3.2.6 motivates the need for a PSN-aware flow-control protocol.
3.2.1 Power Supply Noise (PSN)
The sources of voltage noise in a PDN are (a) resistive drop (IR) and (b) inductive
drop (L∆i∆t). Voltage drop across the resistances of the power delivery wires causes IR drop,
which is proportional to the current (I) in the circuit. Inductive drop, on the other hand,
is caused by the wire inductance (L) of the power grid and is proportional to the rate of
change of current through the inductance.
3.2.2 PSN Estimation Methodology
Accurate estimation of the peak PSN presents methodological challenges. These chal-
lenges stem from cycle-accurate tracking of the pipeline activities of an NoC router, and
evaluating its effect on the PDN. The rigorous cross-layer methodology to tackle these
challenges are outlined next (details in Section 3.4). First, as per the emerging trends, a
dedicated standalone PDN for the NoC is considered [49] to discount the effect of the pro-
cessing cores’ activities on the NoC PDN. Second, energy consumptions by different pipeline
stages of a router are collected using the DSENT tool [51]. Third, the interconnect R,L,C
parameters for various technology nodes are estimated from the ITRS report [52]. Fourth, a
recently proposed MATLAB based PSN tool [10] is converted to C++ and integrated with
the Booksim2.0 NoC architectural simulator [53]. Using the router activity traces generated
by running real workloads, interconnect circuit parameters and router pipeline energies, the
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Table 3.1: Correlation between high core droop events and high NoC droop events.
3.2.3 Limitation of Noise Resilient Microprocessor Schemes in Tackling the
NoC PSN
Noise resilience schemes in microprocessors are ineffective in tackling the NoC PSN
problem due to several key factors. First, researchers are dedicating an independent power-
grid network to NoCs for flexible power management [49]. Consequently, conventional
techniques to tackle the PSN in cores will have little impact on the noise in an NoC PDN.
Second, specific control flow and microarchitectural event sequences may cause voltage
emergencies in the microprocessor pipelines (e.g., a high power instruction followed by a low
power one [54]). As a result, pipeline techniques are designed to alter such event sequences
dynamically. Pipeline droop mitigation techniques can only alleviate voltage noise in the
NoC if there is a strong correlation between voltage droop events on the NoC and similar
events at the core pipeline.
Table 3.1 presents the experimental data to demonstrate that in reality, there is negligi-
ble correlation between large voltage droops at the core pipeline and large voltage droops at
the NoC. For example, assuming a 10% droop as a threshold for high droop, a low 0.02 cor-
relation is found for the benchmark Barnes. This data is collected using a 64-core Intel Xeon
(X5550) processor simulated using the Sniper simulator [55], running representative bench-
marks. The occurrence timestamps of processor and NoC droops are carefully analyzed
to estimate their correlation. This intriguing result stems from fundamental differences in
the activity characteristics within a processor pipeline and the NoC. Unlike a processor
pipeline, the NoC activity is driven by traffic load, rather than individual power footprints
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(c) Peak supply noise.
Fig. 3.1: Trends of interconnect pitch [Figure 3.1(a)], circuit parameters (R,L,C) [Figure 3.1(b)]
and peak voltage noise due to technology scaling [Figure 3.1(c)]. Results of Figure 3.1(a) and 3.1(b)
are normalized to the corresponding 32-nm technology values.
mitigate voltage droop in the NoC.
3.2.4 Results of PSN Trends
In this section, the impact of technology scaling on the PSN is investigated.
Impact of Scaling on Interconnect Parameters
Figure 3.1(a) shows gradual reduction in the global interconnect pitch (M9 global
wire [56]) with technology scaling (ITRS 2013 [57]). As the interconnect width decreases, the
resistance per unit length of the metal layer increases rapidly. Figure 3.1(b) shows the trend
of R,L,C parameters at smaller technology nodes. The NoC is expected to grow in its area
footprint to enable communication among an increasing pool of on-chip components. As a
collective impact of these trends, communication through an NoC will entail an increasing
current for charging/discharging a potentially growing pool of charge reservoirs (device and
wire capacitance), while incurring a greater resistive drop due to the increased interconnect
resistance.
Impact of Scaling on the Peak Supply Noise
Simultaneous switching of transistor devices causes a large variation in current, leading
to a high inductive noise due to the wire inductance. Such a high inductive noise is respon-
sible for the intermittent peaks in the cycle-wise noise profile of a system. As the power






















Fig. 3.2: Measure of high load change in consecutive cycles, for the most exercised router (DBAR).
Bars represent the percentage of total cycles, when the difference in the number of flits served in two
consecutive cycles is 3 or 4 or 5. A higher percentage indicates a more bursty nature of the traffic
pattern.
increases at lower technology nodes. Figure 3.1(c) shows that, in an 8X8 NoC running
uniform-random synthetic traffic, the peak noise increases from 40% of the supply voltage
at the 32-nm technology node to about 80% of the supply voltage at the 14-nm technology
node, if the power distribution strategy remains unchanged.
Peak Supply Noise vs. Router Activity
Figure 3.2 shows the traffic load change (measured as a difference in the number of
incoming flits in two consecutive cycles) on the most exercised router (DBAR) of the NoC,
for a few representative traffic patterns. The y-axis denotes the total percentage of cycles
that have a difference of x (x can be 3, 4 or 5) flits, served in two consecutive cycles. For
example, for the tornado traffic pattern, the most exercised router spends nearly 12% of
the execution time with a high change in the number of flits served in consecutive cycles,
denoting sudden bursts of data. Figure 3.2 also implies that for a considerable fraction of




















Fig. 3.3: Peak and average voltage noise for the most exercised router (DBAR) at the 32-nm
technology node.
3.3 shows the peak and average voltage noise characteristics for various synthetic traffic
patterns, by employing a representative congestion aware routing algorithm—DBAR. The
peak voltage noise data indicates a correlation of the PSN with the bursty nature of synthetic
traffic. In this case, tornado traffic pattern suffers with high PSN due to the high percentage
of load change per cycle, compared to other traffic patterns. The average PSN across traffic
patterns is fairly consistent, as the router undergoes nominal change in router activity for
most of the total execution time.
3.2.5 Inefficacy of Existing Routing Schemes in Mitigating PSN
Many congestion-aware routing schemes choose either XY or YX routing paths based
on the congestion in the network. Figure 3.4 illustrates a concrete example of why such a
strategy is ineffective for PSN mitigation. In this example, nodes 0,1,2 and 6, inject flits
to the destination node 5, in a network employing wormhole flow control. Cases 1 and
2 use XY and YX routes, respectively. It can be seen that, although the routing paths
are different, the per cycle maximum activity (e.g., flit reception) in region A remains
unchanged if all flits are delivered in the same cycle. The possibility of multiple incoming
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Fig. 3.4: An illustrative example revealing the inefficacy of routing algorithms in alleviating regional
PSN.
flits in the same cycles is presented in Section 3.2.4. Hence, both the cases incur similar
PSN in region A. Since existing routing schemes do not consider the temporal nature of flit
delivery to a router, they are inefficient in mitigating PSN. A concrete quantitative evidence
of this negligible impact of congestion aware routing schemes on the PSN is presented in
Section 3.5.2. The proposed schemes monitor and adaptively alter the temporal nature of
flit delivery to effectively reduce the PSN in NoCs.
3.2.6 Impact of Flow-control on the NoC PSN
Existing flow-control protocols (e.g., wormhole) are also unable to mitigate PSN in
NoCs. Simultaneous activity in proximal routers causes a high switching current to be
drawn from the NoC PDN, leading to a large drop in the supply voltage. State-of-the-art
flow-control policies govern the flit propagation in the NoC using a credit system, which
keeps track of the buffer availability in downstream routers. In a 2D mesh NoC topology, a
router can potentially receive a maximum of 4 flits (not considering the injection/ejection
port) in a cycle. As the availability of credits of a router is visible to the adjacent nodes,
proximal routers can potentially receive a large number of flits in the same cycle causing a
local spike in the PSN profile of the NoC. As the range of possible credit utilization goes
up in high radix topologies (e.g., butterfly), the peak PSN is substantially exacerbated.
Inspired by these circuit-architectural insights, novel flow-control and routing algo-
rithms are developed that work in harmony to mitigate noise in an NoC PDN.
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3.3 PSN Aware Runtime Adaptations
In this section, a collection of novel PSN-Aware Flow-control (PAF) protocols and
an adaptive PSN-Aware Routing (PAR) algorithm, collectively known as IcoNoClast, is
presented. IcoNoClast aims to dampen high simultaneous current loads in proximal regions,
by dynamically altering their respective flit acceptance potentials and proactively dispersing
the flit routes in the network. The design challenges are outlined in Section 3.3.1, before
presenting the PAF and PAR techniques in detail in Section 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, respectively.
Section 3.3.4 summarizes the advantages of the proposed techniques, and Section 3.3.5
concludes with the implementation details.
3.3.1 Design Challenges
(a) Performance impact: Run-time adaptations to mitigate PSN should have a low
performance overhead.
(b) Starvation avoidance: Throttling the flit acceptance potential of a router can
create buffer back-pressure in the upstream routers. Under a high flit injection rate, the
back-pressure can grow so large that it may lead to a starvation. It is important to guarantee
freedom from starvation in IcoNoClast.
(c) Scalability: A PSN improvement technique should scale with the size of the
communication fabric. It is imperative to minimize its implementation overhead so as to
sustain its efficacy in future exascale computing.
3.3.2 Design of PAF
The design of PAF involves a hierarchical approach to dictate the Maximum Current
Load (MCL)1 across the NoC, while ensuring a minimal performance impact. Section 3.3.2
outlines an overview of PAF, Section 3.3.2 presents an illustrative example, and Section
3.3.2 discusses the optimizations of PAF.
1MCL of an integrated circuit in an epoch (few cycles) is defined as the highest possible amount of
current that the circuit can draw from the power supply, in that epoch.
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Fig. 3.5: Overview of PAF flow-control protocol. PAF allocates a high MCL to region A and low
MCLs to the other regions in cycle x. In cycle y, only region B is allocated with a high MCL. At
a router granularity, a high FLAP (4) is advertised by the least congested router p in cycle x. In
cycle y, the router q is the least congested and advertises the highest FLAP (3). In both cycle x
and cycle y, the aggregated FLAP of the routers corresponds to the respective MCL based regional
FLAPs. The FLAP in Wormhole flow-control is congestion aware but agnostic of the regional load.
Hierarchical MCL Allocation
High concurrent switching of proximal regions is avoided by carefully adjusting the
MCL allocated to each region. To realize MCL allocation principles at different granu-
larities, a metric called Flit Acceptance Potential (FLAP) is defined. For a given input
channel of a router, the FLAP is set to 1 when it can receive an incoming flit (otherwise it
is set to 0). For a router, the FLAP indicates the aggregate FLAP of its input channels.
Similarly, the FLAP of a particular region represents the aggregate FLAP of the routers
in that region.
At any given time, the FLAP of a router employing wormhole flow control in a 2D
mesh with four input channels is 4, when all of its input channels can receive at least one
flit. PAF allocates variable MCL to each region by dynamically throttling their FLAPs,
irrespective of the space availability in the input channel’s buffers.
MCL allocation is a hierarchical process that can be applied at multiple spatial gran-
ularities. For example, a large region consists of many smaller sub-regions. The allocated
MCL for the large region is distributed among the sub-regions, ensuring that proximal sub-
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regions are not simultaneously allocated with high MCLs. At the lowest granularity, each
router’s FLAP is managed in a manner that is consistent with the MCL allocation of the
entire sub-region.
Illustrative Example
Figure 3.5 depicts the PAF technique using a 4X4 2D-mesh NoC, divided into 4 regions
(A,B,C,D), each comprising 4 routers. In cycle x, PAF allocates a high MCL to region A and
low MCLs to the proximal regions (B,C,D). To ensure a fair provisioning, PAF redistributes
the MCL allocation in cycle y, so that region B is allocated with a high MCL, while its
proximal regions are allocated with low MCLs.
The allocated MCL translates to a regional FLAP, which is distributed among the
routers of a region. For example, in cycle x, a regional FLAP of 13 is distributed among
the routers of region A. Router p advertises a FLAP of 4, while the other routers (q,r and
s) advertise 3 FLAPs each.
Optimizations of PAF
The generic PAF technique needs multiple optimizations to efficiently tackle the design
challenges (Section 3.3.1).
Minimizing Performance Impact: A few complementary approaches are explored that
aim to retain a high performance in PAF.
• Judicious FLAP Management: To avoid a large flit delay in a given region, PAF
allows intermittent high and low FLAPs in a router. For example, in contrast to cycle
x, router q advertises more FLAP (3) in cycle y compared to the other routers.
• Topological Awareness: PAF can be adapted based on the network topology and
expected traffic pattern. For example, central routers in a mesh typically experience
a high resource demand. This demand can be met by allocating greater FLAPs to
the central routers.
• Congestion Awareness: Two broad classification of PAF are explored.
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Congestion Agnostic PAF: This variant of PAF statically allocates high and low
FLAPs to the regional routers based on a round-robin fairness scheme. The FLAP
allocation policy is not influenced by the network buffer occupancy. This variant is
referred to as PAF-Static.
Congestion Aware PAF: This variant of PAF manages the FLAP allocation based
on the relative congestion of the network buffers. The following two congestion aware-
ness are considered at different granularities.
Channel Granularity: The FLAP of the least congested channel of a router is
set to 1, so that it can always receive an incoming flit. The other channels’ FLAPs
are dictated by the aggregate FLAP of the router. This variant of PAF is called
PAF-CG.
Router Granularity: The least congested router of a region is allocated with
a high FLAP. However, the other routers are allocated with low FLAPs to avoid
high simultaneous switching. The aggregate FLAPs of the routers is consistent with
the allocated MCL of the region. For example, in cycle y in Figure 3.5, the least
congested router q advertises more FLAP (3) compared to the other routers, each
of which, advertises 1 FLAP. The aggregate FLAPs (6) of the routers match the
allocated MCL based regional FLAP. This variant of PAF is referred to as PAF-RG.
Avoiding Starvation: Repeated blocking of the flits at the same input channel of a router
in successive cycles can cause a starvation. To avoid starvation, PAF adopts a round-robin
fairness scheme to restrict flit reception across all the input channels of a router. Moreover,
PAF uses deterministically routed escape VCs, allowing all the possible turns in the network
without a deadlock situation.
Scalability: PAF is a hierarchical technique that uses local network information at the
smallest regional granularity to ascertain the FLAPs of the routers. As the size of the
smallest region remains the same even for a larger NoC, PAF can scale efficiently with the
network size (Section 3.5.7).
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Fig. 3.6: PSN Aware Routing Algorithm (PAR).
3.3.3 PAF Aware Adaptive Routing Algorithm
Dynamically throttling the FLAP of a router may cause an intermittent upsurge in the
local PSN due to an increased resource contention. A PAF cognizant routing algorithm,
called PAR (PSN-Aware Routing), is proposed, to circumvent this upsurge, by steering the
flit towards an unthrottled downstream path. Figure 3.6 depicts the conceptual overview of
PAR. PAR primarily makes the routing decision based on the relative regional congestion
information, aggregated solely along the minimal paths. If the chosen output channel has a
throttled FLAP, PAR reroutes the flit to an orthogonal output channel, strictly maintaining
the minimal path constraint. This strategy reduces local current spike and PSN by relieving
router contention, but may occasionally increase the network latency by routing some flits
towards more congested downstream paths. In a scenario, where both the minimal paths
are blocked due to throttled FLAPs, the flit adheres to the initial channel assignment and
waits in the upstream router for another cycle. PAR incurs no additional circuit overhead
as it utilizes the same information required for PAF.
3.3.4 Advantages of PAF and PAR
In this section, the benefits from the proposed flow-control protocol (PAF) and adaptive
routing algorithm (PAR) are summarized. PAF obviates the sudden congregation of flits
in proximal regions of an NoC, by advertising high and low FLAPs in alternate epochs. As
a result, events of large current surge are avoided, leading to a smooth noise profile of the
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Fig. 3.7: IcoNoClast router micro-architecture.
NoC. However, PAF can unobtrusively aid to the local PSN in the upstream paths, due to a
limited reception of flits. To further alleviate such local noise, PAR strives to route some flits
towards the readily available downstream paths. A reduction in the peak noise essentially
translates to a lower voltage guardband for fault-free operation of the NoC. As the routers
will consume less energy under a lower voltage guardband, the proposed techniques promote
energy efficient system design by moderating the maximum noise in the NoC.
3.3.5 Implementation
Figure 3.7 illustrates the implementation of an IcoNoClast router, that involves FLAP
management and congestion management units.
• FLAP Management: Reception of flits in a router is managed by sending a credit valid
signal to the upstream router. A credit valid signal, along with a statically managed,
low overhead, round-robin logic is used to ascertain the FLAP of a router. Addi-
tionally, the credit valid signal is fed with one of the output bits of a simple one-hot
encoded ring counter, to sporadically restrict an incoming flit.
• Congestion Management: A low-bandwidth monitoring network is created to
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propagate the congestion information among the adjacent routers in a region. The
monitoring network involves an aggregation and a propagation module at the router’s
low overhead port preselection logic [58]. The aggregation module combines the
weighted congestion values from the downstream routers and the propagation module
transmits the congestion information to the adjacent routers of a region.
3.4 Methodology
Fig. 3.8: Conceptual overview of the cross-layer methodology.
Figure 3.8 represents the hierarchy of the cross-layer methodology. The evaluation
can be classified into two stages. Section 3.4.1 describes the PSN estimation technique
and Section 3.4.2 discusses various performance metrics to evaluate the efficacy of the
comparative schemes (Section 3.5.1).
3.4.1 Power Supply Noise Estimation
PDN Simulation: Challenges and Solution
SPICE based simulation of the PDNs of the modern VLSI circuits is computationally
prohibitive, due to a large number of grid nodes and circuit elements. On the other hand,
growing complexity of the PDNs (different topologies and on/off-chip capacitors, for exam-
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ple) makes it harder to accurately model them. Therefore, establishing a precise correlation
between architectural events and voltage noise, is highly contingent on fast and accurate
simulation of the PDN.
Many researchers in the past decade have proposed several models to curtail the sim-
ulation time while providing a reasonable accuracy for the node voltage. Using a fast and
direct model proposed by Zheng et al. [59], Dahir et al. have recently devised a MATLAB
based tool to estimate the PSN for the NoC power grid [10]. The power grid in this tool is
modeled as a distributed RLC network. Constant voltage sources and switching capacitors
are used to excite the network, and to model the on-chip activity, respectively. Zheng et al.
have demonstrated that the model sped up the simulations by several order of magnitude
compared to SPICE, with a maximum error of 5% in PSN calculation [59].
Cycle Accurate Noise Calculation
Dahir’s PSN tool is integrated with Booksim2.0, to tightly couple the stages of archi-
tectural evaluation and PSN estimation. The consolidation of the two stages further boosts
the simulation speed and helps diagnose the impact of architectural events on PSN. Cycle-
wise statistics of the voltage are generated at each power grid node for real workloads. The
following data are collected for an accurate estimation of the PSN.
• Interconnect RLC Parameters: The R,L,C values of the grid interconnect are
collected for the 32-nm technology node using the ASU PTM interconnect model [52].
The aspect ratio and pitch of the grid interconnect are obtained based on the ITRS
interconnect predictions [57].
• Router Pipeline Energies: DSENT [51] is used to evaluate the energy of the
router pipeline stages, using the router microarchitectural parameters for the 32-nm
technology node. DSENT models an NoC router as a combination of input/output
buffers, virtual channels, switch allocators and 2-stage crossbars.
• Traffic and Router Activity Dump: The codebase of Booksim 2.0 is instrumented,
in order to dump various router activities (e.g., flit incoming, VC and switch allocation
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Parameters Values
Topology 8X8 regular 2D mesh
Virtual Channels per Port 8
Flit Buffers per VC 8
VC / Switch Allocator iSlip
Traffic Workload PARSEC Benchmarks
NoC Frequency 769 MHz
Table 3.2: Simulation parameters for performance evaluation.
etc.) at each cycle, by running PARSEC benchmarks on an 8X8 regular 2D mesh NoC.
To mimic the traffic generated by multiple co-scheduled applications in an MPSoC, a
heavy random traffic (with a flit injection rate of 0.15) is superimposed on top of the
original application induced traffic of the PARSEC benchmarks.
3.4.2 Performance Evaluation
Table 3.2 details the simulation parameters used in the performance evaluation based
on the following metrics.
Regional Peak PSN
When an application runs, each router in the network endures a varied peak PSN [10].
So, running the entire NoC with a single operating voltage to ensure 100% fault coverage
is energy inefficient. On the other hand, providing each router with a separate operating
voltage, increases the complexity and footprint of the voltage regulators. So, an 8X8 mesh
NoC is divided into 16 regions, each containing 4 routers. Each region is assigned the
minimum operating voltage, to ensure a fault-free communication. The regional peak PSN
of the comparative schemes is evaluated in Section 3.5.3.
Average Network Latency
Booksim2.0 is used as the architectural simulator to run network simulations of the
comparative schemes using real workloads. The simulation is run for 1 million cycles. The
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performance overheads of the comparative schemes are reported in terms of the overall
average network latency in Section 3.5.4.
Energy Delay Product
Mitigating the peak supply noise reduces the minimum voltage guardband required for
100% fault coverage. As a result, all the routers in the network can operate at a reduced
supply voltage and consume less energy. The improvement in the router energy is analyzed
using DSENT [51]. Based on the network latency and the energy consumption of the
routers, the energy efficiency is calculated using the Energy Delay Product (EDP) metric.
Area and Power
The RTL of the open source Stanford Verilog model [60] of a modern virtual channel
NoC router is augmented to implement the IcoNoClast techniques. The router is assumed
to be a part of a 2D mesh topology with 5-input/output ports and 8 VCs per port. The
augmented router RTL is synthesized with the TSMC 45-nm library using Synopsys Design
Compiler. From the synthesis report, the area and power overheads are calculated.
3.5 Experimental Results
In this section, the efficacy and overheads of various comparative schemes are analyzed
(Section 3.5.1). First, the impact of a representative congestion aware routing scheme on the
PSN is presented (Section 3.5.2). The improvement in regional peak PSN and performance
overheads of IcoNoClast are discussed in Sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4, respectively. The energy
efficiency of the schemes is evaluated in Section 3.5.5. A comparison of the mean PSN
for three synthetic traffic patterns at various injection rates is provided in Section 3.5.6.
Finally, the area and power footprints of IcoNoClast are reported in Section 3.5.7.
3.5.1 Comparative Schemes
The comparative schemes are presented in Table 3.3. Each scheme is a combination of
a flow-control protocol and a routing algorithm.
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Table 3.3: Comparative schemes.
Fig. 3.9: Improvement in the regional peak PSN with DBAR compared to DOR. Green regions
represent PSN improvement, while red regions represent PSN degradation.
3.5.2 Can Congestion Aware Routing Tackle PSN?
Figure 3.9 shows the improvement in the regional peak PSN with a representative
congestion aware DBAR routing scheme compared to deterministic Dimension Order (DOR)
XY routing. Both the routing schemes are used, along with wormhole flow-control. DBAR
shows average peak PSN improvements of only 0.1-1%, across all the benchmarks. Some
regions show worse peak PSN with DBAR, as DBAR cannot prevent intermittent influx of
traffic to proximal uncongested regions, leading to an increase in the PSN.
Fig. 3.10: Percentage improvement in regional peak PSN with respect to the baseline for compar-
ative schemes. Each small square represents a region consisting of 4 routers. Reddish and greenish
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Fig. 3.11: Performance overhead (lower is better).
3.5.3 Regional Peak PSN Comparison
Figure 3.10 shows the percentage improvement in regional peak PSN of various com-
parative schemes, with respect to the baseline. The diversity of the improvement stems
from a high degree of skew in the router loads for the real benchmarks. It can be noticed
that PAF-SP, PAF-CP and PAF-RP show more pronounced improvements, as PAR can
mitigate local PSN by reducing the intermittent upsurge in resource contention. In the
PAF-SP scheme, considering the ferret benchmark, it is observed that 14 of the 16 regions
see an improvement in peak PSN, and of these regions, 8 regions benefit from a peak PSN
improvement greater than 10%. The reduction in peak PSN translates to a lower voltage
guardband for these regions resulting in improved energy efficiency. The respective max-
imum regional PSN improvements observed in all the schemes (Section 3.5.1) are 8.1%,
13.2%, 6.6%, 14.8%, 7.8% and 14%, with respective average PSN improvements as 4.7%,
5.7%, 4.1%, 5.5%, 5% and 5.8%. Some regions show slightly worse peak PSN compared to
the baseline, due to occasional increase in local congestion, incurred by the PAF.
3.5.4 Performance Overhead
Figure 3.11 shows the network latency overheads of the comparative schemes, with
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Fig. 3.12: EDP improvement (higher is better).
compared to the other schemes, as PAR sometimes takes more congested downstream paths
in the network (Section 3.3.3). It can also be noticed that PAF-SD performs slightly better
than PAF-RD due to PAF-Static’s inherent fairness in allotting the FLAPs among the
regional routers. As PAF-CG does not throttle the FLAPs of the least congested channels,
both PAF-CD and PAF-CP incur very low performance overheads. There is a maximum
performance degradation of 5.7% (Ferret in PAF-RP) with an average degradation of 4.1%,
across all the schemes.
3.5.5 Energy Efficiency Comparison
Figure 3.12 shows the improvement in energy efficiency of the comparative schemes,
in terms of EDP. To calculate the network energy, it is assumed that each region of the
NoC is running with a minimum voltage guardband, required for fault free communication
(Section 3.4.2). The guardbands are dictated by the peak PSN observed with the pertinent
schemes. It can be noticed that all the variants of PAF incur better EDP, when used along
with PAR routing (PAF-SP, PAF-CP and PAF-RP). A maximum EDP improvement of
12.2% (Swaptions in PAF-SP) is observed, with an average improvement of ∼10%, across




























Fig. 3.13: Mean PSN for three traffic patterns.
PAF variants Area Power
PAF-Static 0.10% 0.16%
PAF-CG/PAF-RG 1.42% 2.38%
Table 3.4: PAF overheads from the synthesized hardware.
3.5.6 Mean PSN Comparison for Synthetic Traffics
Figure 3.13 demonstrates the variation of the mean PSN with packet injection rate, for
three traffic patterns (Transpose, Uniform and Tornado), employing baseline and PAF-RP
schemes. The number of flits per packet is 20. In general, the PSN increases with the
injection rate due to increased switching activity in the routers at higher injection rates. It
is observed that PAF-RP consistently incurs lower PSN compared to the baseline, at all the
injection rates. The reduction in PSN (with PAF-RP) also varies across the traffic patterns,
and the most PSN mitigation at the highest injection rate is observed in Transpose.
3.5.7 Area and Power Footprint
Marginal overheads are reported from the synthesized hardware of the PAF variants
(Table 3.4). The congestion management unit incurs more overhead, compared to the simple
FLAP management unit.
CHAPTER 4
FOSTERING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN A NEAR-THRESHOLD GPU THROUGH A
TACTICAL PERFORMANCE BOOST
4.1 Background and Contributions of This Work
GPUs have demonstrated substantial performance advantages over CPUs, by exploit-
ing large thread-level parallelism in data-intensive, highly parallel applications. With this
immense performance advantage, a GPU’s power consumption has also grown steadily,
reaching 300W [61]. On the other hand, recent advances in Near-Threshold Computing
(NTC), where the supply voltage is set slightly above the device threshold voltage, have
shown a great promise in radically curtailing the chip power consumption. This fantastic
improvement in energy efficiency of NTC circuits does come with a steep performance loss.
To compensate for the performance loss in a single device, NTC circuits generally employ
more devices to execute in parallel [3]. Consequently, a GPU is of particular interest at
NTC, as it is built to exploit parallelism.
While conceptually intriguing, a GPU design for NTC presents two fundamental chal-
lenges. First, elongated delays in NTC circuits make the GPU applications severely sensitive
to Multi-cycle Latency Datapaths (MLDs) within the GPU pipeline. When a GPU thread
heavily utilizes one of these MLDs, like the functional units for transcendental operations,
for example [62], the entire application performance can become latency sensitive, oblit-
erating the advantages of parallel execution. Second, Process Variation (PV) presents a
tremendous design challenge for NTC systems. In fact, a wider spatial-spread of the cores
of a GPU can further exacerbate the core-wise performance asymmetry from PV at NTC.
To tackle these challenges, this chapter identifies the unique opportunities arising at
the near-threshold regime. For example, the emerging NTC era ushers an intriguing pos-
sibility of up to 10X improvement in circuit performance, at a moderate energy cost [5].
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Such a large performance enhancement was never a possibility at STC, since STC circuits
already operate near their minimal delay region [5]. By systematically exploiting such de-
vice level characteristics at the circuit-architecture layer, this chapter presents SwiftGPU:
an energy-efficient GPU design paradigm for NTC. Inherently PV-aware, SwiftGPU tackles
key challenges of NTC GPU designs, by dynamically speeding up the MLDs, and manipulat-
ing the thread level parallelization. Collectively, these techniques mitigate the performance
sensitivity to MLDs, and performance imbalance from PV, substantially improving energy
efficiency at NTC.
The specific contributions in this chapter are discussed next.
• Emerging performance and energy-efficiency hazards are discussed as GPUs operate
at NTC (Section 4.2).
• SwiftGPU, a collection of low-overhead design time and run-time solutions, is pro-
posed, to address the emerging challenges in an NTC GPU. By detecting the utiliza-
tion pattern of MLDs in a stream core, SwiftGPU selectively speeds up their execution
in the stream cores to improve the NTC GPU energy efficiency (Section 4.3).
• Using an elaborate cross-layer methodology (Section 4.4), it is demonstrated that
an average improvement of 14.8% in energy efficiency can be achieved, over an ideal
PV-free STC GPU, across a range of emerging general purpose GPU (GPGPU) appli-
cations. Using synthesis, place and route of a GPU RTL, augmented with SwiftGPU,
the area, wire-length and power overheads are reported to be 0.65%, 2.6% and 3.7%,
respectively (Section 4.5).
4.2 Motivation
In this section, the emerging efficiency hazards for NTC GPUs are explored (Section
4.2.1). Using a rigorous cross-layer methodology (Section 4.2.2), the GPU performance
trends are analyzed at NTC (Section 4.2.3). The potency of a strategic performance boost
is shown to improve the energy-efficiency of NTC GPUs (Section 4.2.4).
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4.2.1 Efficiency Hazards in NTC GPUs
An increase in the number of Compute Units (CUs) 1, is expected to recoup the perfor-
mance loss due to the frequency degradation at NTC. A key research question is, whether
the emerging GPGPU applications can exploit the increased thread level parallelism at NTC,
to sustain the STC efficiency. A few performance bottlenecks are discussed that plague
energy-efficient operation of NTC GPUs.
• Nature of Datapath Usage: Compute-intensive GPGPU applications are likely to
exhibit a high MLD utilization and increased sensitivity to their latencies. Conse-
quently, operating a GPU at NTC will prove to be an inefficient design choice, unless
the execution of the MLDs can be selectively sped up.
• Thread-level Data Dependency: As an NTC GPU has more cores than its
STC counterpart, each core in the former will have less concurrent threads to ex-
ecute, potentially escalating the data-dependency within a CU. The increased data-
dependencies can make the execution latency sensitive, degrading the application
performance.
• Process Variation: NTC circuits are susceptible to within-die process variation,
severely altering the CU frequencies and leakage power of the GPU. According to
Chang et al. , the maximum within-die frequency variation at 22-nm, can be ∼200%,
while operating at the NTC region [63]. It is imperative to efficiently counteract the
effect of PV in an NTC GPU, to sustain a high performance per watt.
4.2.2 Methodology
Multi2Sim 4.2 [64] is used to model AMD’s Evergreen architecture GPU – Radeon
5870. The GPGPU applications from AMD’s Accelerated Parallel Processing SDK suite [65]
are used for performance evaluation. Based on the frequency scaling factors in previous
works [66, 67], the CU frequency at NTC is set to be 25% of the CU frequency at STC.
1A Compute Unit is the fundamental unit of computation, comprising multiple SIMD units, referred to
as stream cores.
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Fig. 4.1: Performance of NTC GPU (Normalized to STC GPU).
To maintain identical theoretical compute bandwidth across the NTC and STC systems, the
number of CUs at NTC is set to be 4X as that of the STC. The original MLD latencies
are between 4 - 40 cycles, for both STC and NTC. To model process-variation, VARIUS-
NTV [68] is used. A detailed methodology description is discussed in Section 4.4.
4.2.3 NTC Performance Trend
Figure 4.1 shows the performance results of three cases: NTC (PV-free NTC GPU ),
NTC-PV (PV-infected NTC GPU ) and NTC-PV-Speedup (PV-infected NTC GPU with
4X MLD boost), normalized to a baseline PV-free STC GPU. All the benchmarks exhibit a
worse performance in the PV-infected NTC GPU, compared to the baseline. A maximum
performance degradation of 90% is observed in EigenValue. It can also be noticed that
the solo impact of PV, brings about severe performance loss with respect to the PV-free
NTC GPU. However, 8 out of 17 benchmarks, perform better than the baseline, when all the
MLDs are statically boosted by a factor of 4X. For example, SobelFilter exhibits a staggering
80% performance improvement with the MLD speedup. The performance degradations in
EigenValue and FastWalshTransform, are also reduced from about 90% to about 60%, by
the MLD speedup.
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Fig. 4.2: Energy of an NTC GPU (Normalized to an STC GPU).
4.2.4 Significance
The initial results reveal that the emerging GPGPU applications are very sensitive to
various NTC hazards, as well as, to the variations in the MLD latencies (Section 4.2.3).
Such a performance sensitivity can have a profound impact on the energy efficiency of
the GPUs. Figure 4.2 shows a preliminary investigation of this impact. With a static
4X boost applied to the MLDs, the PV-infected NTC GPU has a 31.5% reduction in the
average energy consumption, which is 3.5% lower than the energy consumed by the PV-free
STC GPU. This energy benefit comes from a substantial reduction in the leakage energy,
a crucial manifestation of the MLD boost. Inspired by these circuit-architectural insights,
this chapter explores SwiftGPU—a novel energy-efficient GPU design paradigm at NTC.
SwiftGPU incorporates Self-Adaptive Sprint (SAS) technique, to selectively speed up the
processing in the stream cores, to improve the NTC GPU efficiency.
4.3 Self-Adaptive Sprint in NTC GPUs
This section discusses Self-Adaptive Sprint (SAS). SAS promotes an energy-efficient
execution, by tackling the NTC hazards in GPUs. The overview of SAS is presented in
Section 4.3.1 and its circuit-architectural aspects are explained in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.
The dynamic control strategies of SAS are outlined in Section 4.3.4.
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Fig. 4.3: Overview of SAS.
4.3.1 Overview
Figure 4.3 gives an overview of the proposed SAS technique. The SAS Controller
dynamically manages the execution speed of the CU MLDs. To tackle the impact of PV,
a number of crucial design strategies are adopted, ranging from the use of tunable voltage
rails, to a meticulous selection of the MLD speeds. To support several datapath speeds,
the underlying power-delivery network is augmented to allow three different supply voltage
rails: Vdd H, Vdd M and Vdd L, respectively. The SAS controller monitors the runtime
hardware utilization of various CU MLDs, and dynamically adjusts the MLD speed to
improve the energy efficiency of the entire system. A few key design aspects of SAS are
outlined next.
4.3.2 Circuit-level Support for SAS
Providing multiple voltage-rails in the CU datapaths raises several critical design chal-
lenges, discussed next.
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• The specific voltages offered in the rails need to be selected based on the technology
node, circuit level delay characteristics of underlying devices, and associated over-
heads. For example, for the 22-nm technology node and a nominal frequency of 175
MHz, it is determined that Vdd H, Vdd M and Vdd L can be set to 0.6V, 0.42V
and 0.35V, respectively, to enable 4X, 2X and nominal (1X) sprint speeds in the CU
MLDs. Three off-chip voltage regulators are employed for the nominal and higher
voltage rails [69]. Using a transition-time test setup similar to [69], it is observed that
the switching between different supply voltages can complete within one cycle (5.7 ns)
of the NTC GPU.
• The voltage required to sustain a specific sprint, is likely to encounter a spatial vari-
ance due to the PV, compounding the complexity of online boost. To address this
problem, Vdd H, Vdd M and Vdd L are ascertained and recorded, for all the CUs,
after fabrication. Each CU is endowed with its own low-overhead on-chip voltage reg-
ulator [70], to control only its MLD sprint. As the three off-chip regulators can deliver
the required boost at the nominal frequency, such on-chip regulators can essentially
work at a narrow voltage range, preserving a high conversion efficiency. Moreover, the
energy overhead associated with the voltage conversion, is significantly reduced due
to (a) relatively low power consumption of the MLDs (compared to the entire CU),
and (b) sporadic occurrence of the MLD boost. During the kernel execution, the SAS
controller boosts the MLDs, by selecting the appropriate voltage for a CU.
• It is imperative to carefully consider the transition time between different voltage rails.
To accomplish runtime transitions, the voltage rails are augmented with a set of low-
overhead level-shifters, connected to the CU MLD components. Such a level-shifter
consists of 24 transistors, and only adds a marginal delay to the original MLDs [71].
4.3.3 Micro-architecture Support for Functional Correctness
Allowing variable latencies in the datapaths creates several intriguing design challenges
in the micro-architecture, in order to retain its functional correctness.
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• A multi-cycle datapath may complete its computation within a single cycle under
a sprint mode. However, many of the existing CU MLDs are pipelined, thereby
preventing the high-speed computation to propagate to the output. To resolve this
issue, SAS dynamically allows intermediate pipeline registers in these datapaths to
become transparent, forwarding the high-speed computation to the output.
• SAS must allow issuing dependent instructions in a timely manner under the sprint
mode, so as to avoid unnecessary delay. Instruction execution is often tracked using
a fixed set of countdown registers. These countdown registers are altered carefully, in
order to reflect speedy execution and subsequent issue of dependent instructions in
the pipeline.
• During the transition between different voltage rails, the pipeline operations may
become unstable. To prevent incorrect execution, SAS initiates a pipeline flush before
a transition. The overheads from these pipeline flush operations directly influence the
SAS control strategy (e.g., high overhead prohibits frequent transitions).
4.3.4 Dynamic Control of SAS
A key challenge in the design of SAS is dynamically deciding the right boost for speeding
the datapaths in a CU. A few aspects of this intriguing research challenge are outlined next.
Necessity of Dynamic Control
The utilization of MLDs in the GPU processors can vary substantially, altering the
effect of their boost on the GPU performance. A GPU application consists of one or more
kernels. A spatio-temporal variation is observed in the core pipeline utilization, during a
given kernel execution. Three major elements of these variations are: (a) spatial variation
of a given MLD utilization across different thread groups 2; (b) temporal variation of a given
MLD within a single thread; and (c) different utilization of MLDs across thread groups.
Moreover, process variation gives rise to a large difference among the maximum operating
2A thread group is defined as the collection of threads belonging to the same instruction instance. It is
equivalent to warp according to NVIDIA and wavefront according to AMD.
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frequencies of the CU cores. To exploit the widely varying performance gains from MLD
speedups, and the PV induced performance variation, a dynamic control of SAS is explored.
Estimating Maximum Boost
The initial investigation has revealed that a static boost of 4X can effectively toler-
ate the PV, while delivering a comparable or better performance compared to a PV-free
STC GPU (Section 4.2.3). It is also noticed that the performance sensitivity to MLD
boost, steeply declines at the higher sprint speeds. Moreover, over-boosting the MLDs, can
potentially aggravate the overall performance per watt, due to its high energy overhead.
Therefore, in this work, the maximum sprint speed is limited to 4-times the nominal sprint.
Predicting Boost
The kernel characteristics, the MLD utilization pattern and PV induced performance
heterogeneity are used to estimate the amount of boost.
Kernel Characteristics: A preliminary investigation (Section 4.2) reveals that the per-
formance sensitivity of a GPU to an MLD, depends on the number of concurrent threads
executing on the stream core. A small number of concurrent threads, is unlikely to amortize
the MLD latency due to a greater thread-level data-dependency across the CUs (Section
4.2.1). Given the block size (b) and the volume of the concurrent blocks (V) of the kernel,
as well as, the volume of the stream cores on the GPU (Vc), the number of concurrent




A boost in a CU MLD is expected to improve the performance of the GPU only if, tC
is lower than the MLD latency. When a kernel is launched, its dimensions are identified
(usually specified in the kernel), and set the maximum sprint speed (maxSprintSpeed) of an
MLD, according to Algorithm 1, where modalFULatency is the modal latency of the FUs
(4 cycles in this work).
MLD Utilization: Due to variation in the utilization of the MLDs, SAS must be able to
control the sprint speed of each MLD independently. To predict the sprint speed of each
MLD, it tracks the usage of each MLD during every interval (100,000 cycles). At the end
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Algorithm 1 Set Maximum Sprint Speed
1: if tC <modalFULatency/2 then
2: maxSprintSpeed = 4X
3: else
4: maxSprintSpeed = 2X
5: end if
of each interval, the usage of each MLD is compared to a threshold (a certain percentage
of the instruction bundles3). The MLDs with a higher usage than the threshold value for a
particular interval, are given a sprint boost in the next interval.
Spatial Performance Heterogeneity: The performance variance of the CU cores in
SAS can be exploited to mitigate the impact of PV. For example, the slowest CUs are
power-gated, if they are not utilized by the running application. A two-pronged strategy
is adopted for the remaining CUs, executing a kernel. First, the sprint of the slowest
CUs is controlled by their dynamic MLD utilization patterns. Second, to ensure a spatially
balanced performance, the sprints of the faster CUs are optimized, based on their respective
frequency differences from the slowest CU.
Improving the Energy Efficiency of SAS
The energy overhead associated with a higher sprint boost, can potentially reduce
the effective performance per watt. In order to sustain an energy-efficient execution, a
low-overhead monitoring network is created, that periodically adjusts the sprint speed, by
approximately assessing the energy-efficiency of the last epoch. If a new sprint-speed offers
a better efficiency (reflected by a certain percentage improvement), SAS maintains the new
sprint-speed till the next check. A degradation in efficiency leads to a switch-over to the
older sprint-speed for an extended period of time. The iteration interval and the sprint-
speed are optimized, based on specific kernel behavior.
For a decrease in sprint speed, the MLD latency slots in each stream core are doubled.
At the same time, SAS power-gates half of the active stream cores within a CU, and migrates
their threads to the remaining cores [17]. In this way, each thread group will be folded and
3An instruction bundle is a set of simultaneously issued instructions in a CU.
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Fig. 4.4: Overview of the cross-layer methodology.
executed on the remaining cores in a round-robin fashion. On the other hand, an increase in
sprint speed causes the threads to sprawl onto more stream cores. Upon thread migration,
the dirty register data on a stream core will be written back to the local memory. This
write-back can take up-to 1024 cycles, depending on the size of the dirty register data. This
overhead is considered while evaluating the performance of SAS (Section 4.4).
4.4 Methodology
Figure 4.4 shows the overview of the methodology. Multiple layers (e.g., architecture,
device and circuit layer) are considered to rigorously evaluate the efficacy of the proposed




# of stream cores 320 1280
Thread Group Size 64 64/32/16
MLD latency 4- 40 cycles 4- 40 / 1- 10 cycles
Local memory 32Kb, latency: 2-cycles 32Kb, latency: 2-cycles






Table 4.1: GPU configuration.
4.4.1 Architecture Layer
Multi2Sim is used as the architectural simulator [64] . Depending on the kernel dimen-
sions, as well as, the FU usage in each interval, the MLD latency is dynamically changed
(Section 4.3.4). For each benchmark, the GPU kernel is run for 1 iteration, consider-
ing all the possible MLD speedups. The statistics from Multi2Sim is used as inputs to
GPUWattch [72], to evaluate the power consumption of the GPU components. The per-
formance and energy consumption of each interval are used to calculate the overall energy
efficiency of SAS. Table 4.1 lists the architectural parameters for the STC and NTC GPUs,
respectively. The thread group size at STC is statically set to 64. At NTC, the thread
group size is adjusted for different benchmarks, to exploit the increased volume of the
stream cores. From STC to NTC, the volume of the stream cores is increased, and their
frequency is decreased, by a factor of 4X. With this configuration, the memory traffic is
expected to be similar in the STC and NTC GPUs. Therefore, identical configurations for
the memory components, outside of the stream core (i.e., L2 cache and Device Memory),
are used, for both STC and NTC GPUs.
4.4.2 Device Layer
VARIUS-NTV [68] is used to model PV-induced CU-wise performance variation. Based
on a cumulative distribution of the CU speed for 2,000 NTC GPU instances, a collection of
80 CUs are randomly generated, to represent a PV-affected NTC GPU. The fastest CU in
the NTC GPU can run at 3X higher speed than the slowest CU. To evaluate the NTC energy
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consumption, HSPICE simulations are performed on various basic gates and circuits, for
the 22-nm technology node [73]. The simulation considers (a) a canonical 31-stage FanOut-
of-4 (FO4) inverter-chain, and ISCAS85 circuits, to represent various combinational logic
in GPUs; (b) a 6T-SRAM cell and a 10T-SRAM cell [74, 75] to represent the memory
configurations at STC and NTC GPUs, respectively. Previous works have shown that
interconnect power is ∼50% of the core dynamic power at STC [76]. This percentage is
assumed to remain the same at NTC, as voltage scaling equally affects the interconnect and
the core dynamic power.
4.4.3 Circuit Layer
The power results of GPUWattch and the results from the gate-layer simulations are
combined to estimate the power consumed by an NTC GPU. The power values of each
GPU component are then scaled into NTC, according to the power scaling trend obtained
for the representing circuits (Section 4.4.2). To evaluate the overheads, a reference GPU
RTL [77] is augmented with SAS. Place and route phases are performed with Cadence SoC
Encounter, to get a more accurate estimation of the hardware overheads of SAS.
4.5 Experimental Results
In this section, the efficacy and overheads of various comparative schemes are ana-
lyzed (Section 4.5.1). Section 4.5.2 presents the empirical evaluation of the usage threshold
for SAS. Section 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 discuss the performance and energy-efficiency of various
schemes, respectively. Finally, Section 4.5.5 presents the hardware implementation over-
heads of SwiftGPU.
4.5.1 Comparative Schemes
• Frequency Screening (FS): This scheme loosely models the technique proposed
in [78]. The GPU is run at a higher frequency, by disabling the slowest stream cores.
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Fig. 4.5: Energy-efficiency of different usage thresholds. Lower is better. Three thresholds are
tested: TH0(20%), TH1(30%), TH2(40%). Results are normalized to TH0.
• Thread Gather (TG): This scheme resembles the core power-gating technique pro-
posed in [17]. The threads are squeezed to a lesser number of CUs, to reduce the idle
time in each CU (Section 4.1). The idle CUs are power-gated.
• Static Sprint Execution (SSE): SSE employs a static single sprint mode for each
benchmark. The sprint mode is set based on the dimensions of the executing kernel.
• SAS: This is the proposed technique in this chapter. It incorporates TG and dynamic
sprint control, described in Section 4.3.4.
4.5.2 Selecting Threshold For Dynamic Sprint
A single usage threshold is empirically selected for all the FUs in the dynamic sprint
control (Section 4.3.4). Three different thresholds, 20%, 30%, 40%, are explored and their
respective energy-efficiencies in terms of the Energy Delay Product (EDP) are measured.
The sprint speed is ascertained by the dimensions of the executing kernel. Figure 4.5 shows
that, all the thresholds have marginal differences in energy efficiency (less than 5%), in
10 out of 17 benchmarks. However, a threshold of 20% offers remarkably better energy-
efficiencies in a few benchmarks (e.g., BitonicSort). So, a 20% usage threshold is chosen in
the dynamic sprint control.
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Fig. 4.6: Performance Comparison. Higher is better.
4.5.3 Performance Results
Figure 4.6 depicts the performance of various comparative schemes (Section 4.5.1). The
results are normalized to an ideal PV-free STC GPU, without any enhancements. Both FS
and TG deliver remarkably degraded performance than the proposed techniques (SSE and
SAS), as they employ less number of cores, and do not perform sprinted MLD execution.
Although both FS and TG offer an overall similar performance, they extensively diverge
for several benchmarks. SSE globally outperforms all the other schemes. The performance
of SAS is lower than that of the SSE for most of the benchmarks, as sprint execution
is dynamically throttled in SAS. Despite a 75% reduction in the operating frequency, the
average performance of SAS enabled NTC-GPU is only 13.4% lower than that of the baseline
PV-free STC GPU, across all the benchmarks.
4.5.4 Energy-Efficiency Results
Figure 4.7 shows the energy benefits of all the comparative schemes, compared to the
baseline PV-free STC GPU. For most benchmarks, both FS and TG consume more energy
than the proposed techniques. A major source of this energy over-consumption comes
from leakage, which is a significant fraction of the total energy in NTC circuits [3, 21],
and proportional to the application execution time. However, in several benchmarks (e.g.,
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Fig. 4.7: Energy Comparison. Lower is better.
Fig. 4.8: Energy-efficiency Comparison. Lower is better.
PrefixSum), the proposed techniques consume more energy than FS or TG. Such results
signify the inefficacy of employing sprint execution in the slow cores. Therefore, it is prudent
to power-gate the slower cores, and execute all the threads in the faster cores, at a higher
frequency. Across all the benchmarks, SSE always has the higher energy consumption than
SAS, as the former always enables sprint execution in all the MLDs. Overall, the average
energy consumption of SAS is 33.6% lower than the baseline STC GPU.
Figures 4.8 illustrates the energy efficiency of the comparative schemes, in terms of
EDP. The results are again normalized to the baseline STC GPU. The escalated perfor-
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mance and the reduced energy consumptions of the proposed schemes, compound to an
overwhelming benefit in EDP, compared to FS and TG. SAS shows an 18.9% improve-
ment in EDP over SSE, as SSE is more power-hungry than SAS. SAS also outperforms the
baseline STC GPU, with an EDP improvement of 14.8%.
4.5.5 Implementation Costs
The hardware cost of SAS can be attributed to two major factors: the sprint execution
infrastructure (Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3) and the SAS control framework (Section 4.3.4). As
usually available in modern GPUs, the implementation cost of pipeline flush and instruction
replay, as well as, the performance counters, that track the FU usage, are excluded. Evalu-
ated with the cross-layer methodology, the area, wire-length and power overheads for SAS
implementation are 0.65%, 2.6% and 3.7%, respectively, compared to the original GPU.
CHAPTER 5
UNCOVERING THE PARADIGM SHIFT IN SECURITY VULNERABILITY AT
NEAR-THRESHOLD COMPUTING
5.1 Background and Contributions of This Work
Evolution in low-power computing over the last decade has resulted in an unprece-
dented integration of electronic devices with human beings, fostering a sustainable digital
environment. Owing to the benefits of Dennard scaling and a rapid advancement in pack-
aging technology, the researchers foresee a ubiquitous adoption of Body Area Networks,
comprising low-power, high-performance computing devices, such as, Internet of Things
(IoT) [79]. This tremendous revolution in human-computer proximity, however, raises se-
rious security concerns, stemming from the low-power operations of the silicon devices. In
several critical applications (e.g., implantable medical devices), a single security breach can
be detrimental. Although, the research in energy-efficient computing has matured over the
years, understanding the security vulnerabilities of low-power devices is still at a nascent
stage. In this work, real hardware-based experiments are performed that demonstrate an
increasing security vulnerability as one moves to low-power systems.
Near-Threshold Computing (NTC)—a promising platform for low-power systems—has
recently gained traction in the research community [3]. However, moving from traditional
super-threshold computing to NTC, alters many of the device characteristics, jeopardizing
trustworthy computing. For example, a slight variation in the supply voltage impacts the
circuit delay characteristics significantly, enabling copious opportunities for timing fault
attacks at NTC (Section 5.2). In order to exploit this security loophole, a novel threat
model is proposed, referred to as Timing Fault Attack at NTC (TITAN). TITAN can
inflict a range of security breaches in a low-power mobile platform.
Demonstrating the resilience to a TITAN in a real hardware setup presents a massive
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methodological challenge, primarily due to the unavailability of commercial NTC commodi-
ties. This challenge is tackled by architecting an ex-situ fault-attack platform, integrated
with an open-source microprocessor, operating at a very low supply voltage (Section 5.4).
Using an off-the-shelf hardware environment, glitches are injected in the supply voltage
of the microprocessor, running security critical applications. It is shown that two parameters
of the voltage glitch, viz., minimum glitch width and minimum glitch magnitude (defined in
Section 5.4.3), dictate the resilience of a system to timing fault attacks. With a fine-grain
glitch control mechanism, a reduction of 1.6X (in terms of minimum glitch width), and
2.8X (in terms of minimum glitch magnitude) in timing fault resilience are demonstrated at
a low-power operating condition, compared to a traditional STC operation. These results
portend a tremendous susceptibility of the NTC systems to TITAN.
The following are the key contributions of this chapter:
5.1.1 Contributions
• The trend in the timing fault vulnerability of a given circuit is demonstrated as the
circuit’s operating condition shifts from STC to NTC (Section 5.2).
• The proposed threat model TITAN exploits the security vulnerabilities of NTC, to
inflict potent timing fault attacks in low-power mobile platforms (Section 5.3).
• Using an off-the-shelf hardware and a voltage (VCC) glitching technique, it is demon-
strated that a low-power operation exhibits an aggravated vulnerability to TITAN,
compared to traditional STC (Section 5.6.2 and 5.6.3).
• By instrumenting GDB driven architected states, the user-level impacts of TITAN are
analyzed in various real-life applications (Section 5.6.4).
5.2 Motivation
To establish a deeper comprehension into this research, the following two key questions
need to be answered: (a) How does NTC transform the vulnerabilities of a given circuit? and
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Change in Delay


































































(b) PV-induced delay degrada-
tion at STC and NTC, normal-




























(c) Variation of timing fault vul-
nerability with clock frequency.
Fig. 5.1: Figure 5.1(a) shows a higher delay sensitivity to supply voltage variation at NTC, with
respect to STC. This trend results in a higher instruction level delay degradation at NTC, compared
to STC (Figure 5.1(b)). Figure 5.1(c) depicts the increasing timing fault vulnerabilities of the SUM
and CARRY bits of a full-adder circuit as the operating frequency changes from STC to NTC.
(b) What are the ramifications of the circuit layer vulnerability of near-threshold computing,
at the application layer?
5.2.1 Timing Fault Vulnerability: STC vs. NTC
The vulnerability of a circuit to timing faults primarily depends on the circuit’s delay
sensitivity to supply voltage variation. Figure 5.1(a) demonstrates a maximum of ∼6X
difference in the delay variation for a couple of representative benchmarks (viz., 31-stage
FO4 inverter-chain and ISCAS85’s C6288) at NTC, compared to STC, under the same
percentage voltage variation. The following section discusses how the process variation
(PV) acts as an accomplice to aggravate this delay sensitivity, thereby exacerbating the
timing fault resilience of the NTC circuits. Subsequently, the timing fault vulnerabilities of
STC and NTC circuits are quantified and compared.
Process Variation
An integrated circuit operating at NTC, suffers from substantial PV-induced delay
variations, up to 20X more than circuits at the nominal STC voltage [68, 80]. This delay
variation can be attributed to the radically diminished voltage overdrive (i.e., the difference
between the threshold and the supply voltage). In fact, a surprisingly small number of PV
affected gates can drastically alter the critical paths manifested at runtime [81]. At the
architecture level, a substantial variation in the instruction level delay profile is expected,
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seen during a program execution. Unavailability of off-the-shelf NTC commodities makes it
infeasible to compare the PV-induced delay variations in fabricated STC and NTC chips.
Hence, to investigate the instruction level delays at STC and NTC, a statistical timing
analysis is performed, as detailed next.
Methodology
First, the execute stage of a 32-bit RISC processor with MIPS style ISA is generated,
using the FabScalar setup [82]. Second, the RTL of the execute stage is synthesized with
the 15-nm Nangate library [83], using Synopsys Design Compiler. The operating voltage-
frequency values for STC and NTC are chosen to be (0.8V, 1GHz) and (0.45V, 250MHz),
respectively. Third, using an in-house statistical timing analysis tool, the cycle accurate
delay timings of all the sensitized paths of the execute stage are studied, for 7 different
arithmetic and logic operations. The operands are chosen to cover a typical range seen in
real applications. To model within-die process-variation at STC and NTC, the VARIUS [84]
and VARIUS-NTV [68] setup are chosen, respectively.
Results
Figure 5.1(b) shows the variation in the instruction level delay—during the execute pipe
stage—at STC and NTC conditions. The figure shows the Normalized Delay Degradation
(Y-axis), which estimates the increase in delay, expressed as a percentage of the clock
period, due to a very small fraction of PV-affected logic gates in the sensitized paths of
an instruction. For a conservative estimate, only 0.2% gates of the circuit are assumed
to be affected by PV, in all the cases. From Figure 5.1(b), two key observations can be
made: (a) the delay degradation of all the instructions increase from STC to NTC, and
(b) different instructions exhibit different variations in the delay profile. Instructions with
higher degraded delays are more vulnerable to PV-induced timing faults. For example, the
delay degradation of the LOAD instruction at NTC is ∼1.8X compared to that at STC.
Hence, the probability of timing errors in the sensitized paths of the LOAD instruction
almost doubles at NTC, with respect to STC.
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Fig. 5.2: Manifestation of vulnerabilities in the low-power NTC circuit at the application level. Due
to the diverse impacts of process variation in three chips, clear differences in the program outcome
can be observed from the highlighted code snippet. The blue and red colors signify correct and
incorrect values, respectively.
An increase in instruction delay adversely impacts the vulnerability at the circuit layer.
Figure 5.1(c) shows a massive increase in the timing fault vulnerability1 of the primary
outputs of a full-adder circuit, as its operating frequency spans from the conventional STC
to the NTC regime (i.e., lower frequency). The vulnerability further aggravates in the
presence of clock skew in the circuit. For this illustrative example, Scope of Vulnerability is
used as a measure of vulnerability from timing faults [31]. This work exploits this aggravated
vulnerability of the NTC circuits to create a unique threat model based on timing fault
attacks.
5.2.2 Application Behavior under Timing Faults
Figure 5.2 demonstrates how a circuit vulnerability can have a real impact during
program execution. It can be observed that an incorrect data is latched into the register
file, as a snippet of code suffers from timing faults. To further complicate these issues,
at NTC, the PV signature, and its corresponding delay characteristics, vary substantially
among different post-silicon chips. For example, in Figure 5.2, chip 1 experiences a timing
fault in the LOAD instruction, whereas, chip 2 experiences a timing fault in the ADD
instruction. Such a variation can create a moving target for the attackers, allowing a rogue
application to inflict damage, while remaining undercover due to its non-determinism.
1The probability of a timing violation at the output node of a circuit.
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Fig. 5.3: Proposed TITAN threat model showing the trusted and untrusted components in a low-
power mobile platform. A malicious patch comprising a potent stressmark induces intermittent
voltage droop in the power delivery network of the processor. As a consequence, co-executing
instructions of the victim application become prone to timing errors, potentially leading to discrepant
behavior at the software/system level.
5.2.3 Unique Security Threat at NTC
Collectively, these trends indicate a compelling domain of research for trustworthy
computing in low-power platforms. In this pursuit, it is critical to explore a threat model
that can effectively exploit the circuit-level vulnerability at the application layer in low-power
systems. Such a threat model embodies a software-hardware coalition and is effective in the
modern software ecosystem.
5.3 Proposed Threat Model: TITAN
Figure 5.3 illustrates the proposed threat model—TITAN—in the realm of a low-power
mobile platform, and shows the boundary of trust in the threat model. A covert insertion of
a malicious patch (also referred to as a malware) is considered, in the application software,
through a rogue application developer. The malware is essentially a potent stressmark that
can be designed for a specific processor and is capable of sporadically generating customized
voltage droop events [85]. As a consequence, the instructions belonging to the co-executing
applications are susceptible to droop induced timing faults, potentially leading to erroneous
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and/or undesired application behaviors.
Please note that evaluating the efficacy of TITAN in real hardware is contingent on an
accurate measurement of the potency of the malware. Given the unavailability of commer-
cial NTC mobile processors, this challenging task is addressed by designing an ingenious
hardware setup, discussed in Section 5.4. Various phases of the TITAN are described next.
5.3.1 Phases of the TITAN
To show the practical relevance of the attack model, three operational phases are formu-
lated: malware injection (Section 5.3.1), activation (Section 5.3.1) and operation (Section
5.3.1).
Malware Injection
Due to a rigorous process of software testing, it is assumed that the initial release of the
application software is free from a malware. Subsequently, the software can be tampered
through a malicious patch [86]. The malware, having an extremely low activity footprint,
can be easily camouflaged in the statistics collection module of the software, which aims to
improve the user experience [87]. The modified application can then initiate its operation
(detailed in Section 5.3.1), disrupting trustworthy computing in an NTC processor. The
malpractice of downloading updates from untrusted repositories, magnifies the scope of a
malware injection using this route.
Activation
The malware can be launched using an automatic trigger-based activation technique,
which is very challenging to detect [88]. An existing bug in the legacy code can trigger the
malware by creating a rare event [89]. To ensure a stealthy operation, a TITAN creates a
time-based trigger, similar to the interrupt handler of a watchdog timer. The trigger can
be implemented as a conditional jump, evaluating on the rare event. The attack vector is
distributed to prevent an early detection.
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Operation
The malware uses software-induced fault generation technique to launch potent timing
fault attacks. In this pursuit, the malware is instrumented with fault inducing instructions,
to impact the execution of the vulnerable instructions of the victim application. Each of
these distinct categories of instructions is described next.
Fault Inducing Instructions: Researchers have discovered that when a sequence of
high power consuming instructions is executed immediately after a sequence of low power
consuming instructions, a local voltage droop (i.e., an inductive or a ∆I droop event) is
induced in the power delivery network (PDN) of the core [90]. Collectively, these two
sequences of instructions are called a stressmark. Zhang et al. have recently shown that the
NTC systems are highly vulnerable to inductive droop, despite being dominated by a large
leakage current [91]. This drawback is exploited to create a stressmark in the threat model
which is capable of overwhelming the design margin of the NTC processors by inducing a
large voltage droop in the PDN of the core.
This induced voltage droop can increase the instruction delays, potentially causing
timing faults in the datapaths between a pair of pipeline register banks [92]. Since, the
delay sensitivity to supply voltage variation is much greater at NTC, compared to STC
(due to an aggravated impact of PV), the execution of a stressmark makes some of the
co-executing benign instructions in the pipeline vulnerable to timing errors.
Vulnerable Instructions: Section 5.2 demonstrates how each fabricated NTC chip
of the same design can have a different set of long delay instructions, post fabrication, due
to PV. As these long delay instructions are highly susceptible to timing fault attacks, they
are termed as the vulnerable instructions. The malware aims to induce timing faults in
the majority of these vulnerable instructions, belonging to a co-executing benign application.
Due to a substantially varied PV signatures of the fabricated NTC chips, the same malware
in different chips can potentially cause timing faults in different vulnerable instructions of
the same application. Such non-determinism allows TITANs to inflict a range of end-user
breaches in a stealth mode.
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5.3.2 Scope of a TITAN
The scope of a TITAN depends on the specific vulnerabilities of a chip. A timing fault in
an issue stage, may cause a premature dispatch of an instruction, leading to a data hazard
in the pipeline. On the other hand, repeated fault attacks in a branch instruction, may
always result in a taken branch. Such architectural events can have different ramifications
at the application layer (Section 5.6.4).
5.3.3 Limitations of a TITAN
• It is assumed that the processor cores of an NTC system support the Hyper-Threading
technology, so that multiple applications can simultaneously execute as different inde-
pendent threads, belonging to the same core. Consequently, the malware, executing
on one thread of a core, can launch timing fault attacks on a benign application,
executing on a different thread of the same core.
• The malware is agnostic of the timing characteristics of the victim applications. Dur-
ing the intermittent active phases (Section 5.3.1), the malware aims to induce timing
faults in the vulnerable instructions of all the co-executing benign applications. As a
result, an end-user is likely to witness different and unpredictable faulty application
behaviors at different times, due to the same TITAN malware.
• In a multi-core system, if the malware and the victim application execute on differ-
ent cores, the former is unlikely to launch a successful timing fault attack on the
latter. This is because, the effect of the malware-generated voltage drop is inversely
proportional to the distance between the cores [93]. Moreover, modern multi-core
devices dedicate a separate power delivery network and power management policy for
each core, thereby further reducing the impact of voltage drop from one core to the
other [94]. To efficiently tackle these challenges, an adversary can set the CPU affinity
mask of the malware to multiple core IDs of the device [95]. Therefore, the malware
can sporadically run on different cores, increasing the efficacy of TITAN.
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5.3.4 Can Rebooting the Device Tackle TITAN?
Manually rebooting a device affected by TITAN can temporarily avoid the imposed
security threat. However, the device will be exposed to the same threat upon restart; or
it might have already been compromised even before rebooting. Moreover, rebooting may
not be a plausible option for many emerging low-power IoT devices. For example, health
monitoring devices can risk the loss of a patient's life if it undergoes an untimely reboot [96].
Also, a smartphone acting as a data aggregator in a remote patient monitoring system based
on an IoT cloud architecture [79], may not have the opportunity for rebooting, lest affected
by a TITAN.
5.3.5 Classic Malware Vs. Malware in TITAN
The extent of the damage inflicted by most existing malware is limited to the soft-
ware level. Moreover, most of such malware can be efficiently detected and terminated
by available anti-virus software. On the other hand, the malware in TITAN, exploits a
circuit-level vulnerability (i.e., a high delay sensitivity to supply voltage variation, resulting
in a poor tolerance to timing fault attacks), to tamper application/system level integrity.
Moreover, the vulnerabilities of the hardware being widely varying across various chips of a
given design (due to PV), the same malware in TITAN can potentially cause different and
unpredictable application malfunctions in different chips of the same design (Section 5.2.2
and 5.3.2). Consequently, designing a generic detection and prevention scheme for TITAN
is extremely challenging.
5.4 Hardware Setup to Gauge Resilience Against a TITAN
In this section, the proposed hardware setup is discussed to evaluate the resilience of
the low-power systems against a TITAN.
5.4.1 Unavailability of NTC Hardware
Designing an actual TITAN system is practically very challenging, primarily due to
the unavailability of off-the-shelf NTC mobile commodities. Intel demonstrated a proof-of-
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Fig. 5.4: Operating voltage ranges of state-of-the-art commercial low-power processors.
concept Near-Threshold Voltage x86 microprocessor, called Claremont, at ISSCC 2012 [97].
However, Claremont is not available in the market for purchase. On the other hand, the
state-of-the-art low-power processors operate in the STC range. Figure 5.4 shows the oper-
ating voltage ranges of some commercially available low-power processors. The lower limit
of the operating voltages among these chips is the lowest (0.8V) for Broadcom BCM2835,
based on the Raspberry-Pi official documentation [98]. Hence, Raspberry-Pi is chosen as the
platform for realizing TITAN. Please note that existing works on low-voltage fault attacks
also could not operate a general purpose processor below 0.9V [99].
Minimum Operating Voltage: Although the Raspberry-Pi official documentation states
that the core can be undervolted up to 0.8V by changing the voltage-frequency (VF) settings
in the OS configuration files, the actual voltage measured at the Vdd core pin [100], does
not fall below 1.05V. It is also observed that despite switching the Vdd core supply to
an off-board regulated power supply after successfully booting the core with the on-board
supply, the core stops working below 1.05V. Hence, 1.05V is the minimum operating voltage
in the experiments. However, 1.05V does not truly represent an NTC operating voltage.
Considering this practical limitation, the fault resilience of the Raspberry-Pi is evaluated
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as the operating voltage sweeps from 1.4V to 1.05V. Based on the resilience trend in that
voltage interval, the fault resilience at NTC operating conditions is predicted (Section 5.6).
5.4.2 Malware Emulation
The malware in TITAN is a potent stressmark that induces timing faults by occasionally
introducing voltage droop in the power supply of the underlying processor (Section 5.3).
To gauge the resilience of a processor to fault attacks at various VF levels, one needs to
generate stressmarks of precise magnitude and duration. Automating custom stressmark
generation, although explored by many researchers in the past [101], requires a rigorous
cross-layer methodology which is orthogonal to this work. Moreover, during a low-voltage
operation, a large voltage droop (beyond the guardband of the processor) can potentially
disrupt the OS kernel, resulting in a failure to record the precise stressmark parameters, if
the malware is running on the victim processor itself.
Hence, to mimic the behavior of the malware in TITAN, a fine-grain voltage (VCC)
glitch injection technique is used that launches timing faults (via a separate hardware setup)
in the victim processor. This is a reasonable approach, as both voltage droop and VCC
glitch can manifest as timing faults in an integrated circuit, despite having different temporal
characteristics. As the primary goal of the hardware experiments is to demonstrate the
resilience of a system against a TITAN, the source of timing faults (be it stressmark induced
voltage droop or VCC glitch) does not have a paramount impact on the final conclusion
(Section 5.6).
Next, two important glitch parameters are discussed to gauge the resilience of a system
to TITAN (Section 5.4.3). Subsequently, the roles of each hardware component are described
in relation to a TITAN (Section 5.4.4).
5.4.3 Important Glitch Parameters
Figure 5.5 depicts the two crucial glitch parameters, glitch width and glitch magnitude,






Fig. 5.5: Important VCC glitch parameters: glitch width and glitch magnitude.
Glitch Width
Glitch width is the time duration for which a voltage glitch lasts. A relatively larger
glitch width is equivalent to a relatively large number of consecutive ∆I droop events,
created by a potent stressmark. For a given system, running at a specific operating voltage-
frequency, minimum glitch width is defined as the shortest time duration of a voltage glitch,
sufficient to cause the Point of First Failure (PoFF) [102] in a running application. Hence,
greater the minimum glitch width, more resilient is the system to timing fault attacks.
Glitch Magnitude
Glitch magnitude is the absolute amount of drop in the supply voltage from its nominal
value. A larger glitch magnitude is analogous to a larger ∆I voltage drop. Minimum glitch
magnitude is defined for a system operating at a given voltage-frequency, as the smallest
absolute drop from the nominal supply voltage, sufficient to cause the PoFF in a running
application. Hence, like minimum glitch width, greater the minimum glitch magnitude,
more resilient is the system to timing fault attacks.
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Fig. 5.6: Conceptual block diagram of the TITAN hardware environment. The ChipWhisperer-Lite
(CW-Lite) board acts as an attacker that launches fault attacks in an application running on the
victim Raspberry-Pi module.
5.4.4 Hardware Components
Figure 5.6 shows the conceptual overview of the experimental setup. To launch a
timing fault attack, the VCC glitch injection module, embedded in the ChipWhisperer-
Lite board is used. The glitch injection module injects glitches in the supply voltage of
the victim Raspberry-Pi that runs an application software. The ChipWhisperer-Lite board
and the Raspberry-Pi are interfaced with a desktop computer, used for triggering glitches,
controlling various glitch parameters and collecting glitch results. The component details
of the attacker and the victim modules are discussed next.
ChipWhisperer-Lite: The Attacker
Figure 5.7(a) shows the CW1173 ChipWhisperer-Lite (CW-Lite) board.
Glitch Injection Module: The primary component of the module is a Xilinx S6LX9
FPGA. The Digital Clock Manager (DCM) block inside the FPGA is used to configure var-
ious glitch parameters at the design time. However, using Xilinx’s Partial Reconfiguration
(PR) technique, multiple adjustments can be performed at runtime by instrumenting the











(a) A ChipWhisperer-Lite board connected to a
Raspberry-Pi. The magnitude of the injected
glitch is controlled using a custom potentiometer.
(b) VCC glitch module of the CW1173
ChipWhisperer-Lite board, connected to the
BCM2837 chip of the Raspberry-Pi.
Fig. 5.7: TITAN hardware environment and the circuit diagram for VCC-glitch injection.
voltage drop across potentiometer
voltage drop across core
(a) Voltage drops across the core and the po-
tentiometer during a failed fault attack at (1.2V,
700MHz).
voltage drop across potentiometer
voltage drop across core
(b) Voltage drops across the core and the poten-
tiometer during a successful fault attack at (1.4V,
800MHz).
Fig. 5.8: While triggering a glitch, a larger voltage drop across the potentiometer, due to including
all the turns of wire, results in a very small voltage drop across the core. So, the fault attack is not
successful. On the other hand, if a fewer turns of wire is included in the potentiometer, the core
input voltage drops appreciably, resulting in a successful fault attack.
Controlling Glitches: At each VF level of the victim hardware, running an application,
the minimum glitch width and the minimum glitch magnitude are ascertained (Section
5.4.3). A constant glitch magnitude (equals to the victim supply voltage: vdd core) is
maintained while ascertaining the minimum glitch width. On the other hand, the largest
possible glitch width from the module is maintained while determining the minimum glitch
magnitude.
• For each round of experiment, a custom automation script is used to trigger a glitch
100 times, with an interval of 500 milliseconds between two consecutive glitches. A
faster triggering rate might damage the glitching MOSFET of the DCM (used to
short the victim core’s power line to the ground voltage) due to a high frequency
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short circuit current through it. On the other hand, a slower triggering rate will
prolong the turnaround time of the experiment.
• The glitch injection module allows customization of the glitch width. However, the
module only glitches the victim’s supply voltage to the ground (∼0V), and does not
allow controlling the glitch magnitude. The voltage at the victim core during the
glitch, depends on the length of the wire connecting the CW-Lite board and the
victim (Figure 5.7(b)). Hence, the glitch magnitude is varied by changing the length
of that wire using a custom potentiometer, connected between the grounds of the
glitch module and the victim core (Rpot. in Figure 5.7(b)).
• Figure 5.8 depicts two screenshots of the oscilloscope signals, during a failed and a
successful fault attack, respectively. In the first case, most of the voltage is dropped
across the potentiometer due to including all the turns of wire, and hence the core
supply voltage does not drop enough to cause a successful fault attack. However, in
the second case, the core supply voltage drops sufficiently due to a reduced wire-length
of the potentiometer, resulting in a successful fault attack.
• It is confirmed that the minimum glitch width and minimum glitch magnitude, mea-
sured at each voltage-frequency, reflect the resilience of only the processor core of the
Raspberry-Pi, and not of any other parts of the system. In this pursuit, only the core
VF-level is reduced, and the memory VF-level is kept constant throughout the exper-
iments, to realize a realistic NTC system [81]. Also, the activity of the I/O is kept as
minimum as practically possible, for example, by doing SSH through Ethernet over
HDMI, to connect to the Raspberry-Pi, as the former is more resistant to transient
voltage fluctuations during glitch injection, and has a negligible activity footprint.
Raspberry-Pi: The Victim
Raspberry-Pi 3 Model B is used as the target victim platform on which a VCC glitch
attack can be launched during an application execution. This model has a 1.2 GHz 64-bit
quad-core ARMv8 CPU with 1 GB RAM and VideoCore IV 3D graphics core, and runs on
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Raspbian OS. The input voltage port of the ARM core is connected to the glitch port of the
CW-Lite board (Figure 5.7(a)). In the following, the on-board voltage-frequency control
mechanism is discussed to create various operating points.
On-board Voltage-Frequency Control: The Raspbian OS allows sweeping the oper-
ating voltage of the BCM2837 chip (ARMv8 core) with a granularity of 25 millivolt. The
operating frequency can be controlled through a system file.
• The operating conditions are varied until the lowest allowable VF-level of the Raspberry-
Pi. For the experiments, the range of operating conditions is: (1.4V, 800MHz) to
(1.05V, 600MHz). The experimental results, obtained from this operating range, por-
tends an extremely aggravated vulnerability of the NTC systems to TITAN, compared
to traditional STC systems (Section 5.6).
• To ensure sufficient available slack in the system, the operating frequency is reduced
by 50MHz, for a reduction of ∼0.1V in the operating voltage. It is also ensured that
each application runs without any error when no glitch is applied.
5.5 Applications
In this section, a brief description of the applications is given that are used to evaluate
the resilience against a TITAN at various operating conditions.
• Edge Detection App: This application is based on a water flow-like metaheuristic
algorithm in Python. The algorithm emulates the behavior of water that always flows
down to lower altitude regions and divides regions based on the minima that water
approaches.
• Matrix Multiplication: This application performs 8-bit matrix multiplication in
C++ using Eigen APIs.
• K-means Clustering: The application uses an algorithm, implemented in C, that
is based on a single-pass implementation with an iterative batch update process. The
error in application execution is measured in terms of erroneous cluster membership.
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• Decision Tree Classifier: The application implements an entropy-based decision
tree binary classifier in C++. The accuracy of the algorithm is determined based
on 10-fold cross validation on a multivariate dataset from the UCI Machine Learning
Repository.
5.6 Experimental Results
In this section, the results of the TITAN hardware experiments are analyzed. Section
5.6.1 describes the system level impacts of a successful timing fault attack in the experi-
ments. Section 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 present the variation of minimum glitch width and minimum
glitch magnitude at different operating conditions, revealing the trend of timing fault re-
silience. Section 5.6.4 presents the tangible impacts of TITAN in a few real applications.
5.6.1 System Level Impacts of Fault-Attacks
In the experiments, a successful timing fault attack results in one of the following
occurrences: segmentation fault in the application, crash in the operating system, kernel
error or system failure. Such a deviation from the expected operation of an application
can have serious consequences. For example, a successful fault attack in an edge detection
application used in a pattern based password recognition system, can deny a sign-in process
despite drawing the correct pattern.
5.6.2 Minimum Glitch Width Variation
Figure 5.9(a) shows the variation of minimum glitch width, with operating voltage-
frequency for four applications. The Y-axis values are normalized to the minimum glitch
width at the highest operating point (HOP): (1.4V, 800 MHz).
The trend-lines for all the applications exhibit a monotonic decrease in the minimum
glitch width as the operating condition shifts towards the NTC values. Two crucial conclu-
sions are drawn from Figure 5.9(a). First, the lowest operating point is significantly more
susceptible to timing faults (1.6X on an average) with respect to the HOP, for all the ap-












































































(b) Variation in minimum glitch magnitude.
Fig. 5.9: Variation in minimum glitch width and minimum glitch magnitude. A lower value in the
Y-axis indicates a poorer fault resilience.
(1.05V, 600 MHz). This apparent anomalous behavior is due to a higher available slack in
the system, caused by an incommensurate reduction of the supply voltage, with respect to
the reduction in the operating frequency. However, despite the availability of more timing
slack, a lower operating point exhibits a poor fault tolerance in general, primarily due to an
increased instruction level delay sensitivity to supply voltage variation. As an NTC system
operates at a much lower VF-level than the operating points in the experiments, it is con-
jectured that the timing fault resilience at NTC is much worse, leading to a significantly
increased vulnerability to TITAN.
5.6.3 Minimum Glitch Magnitude Variation
Figure 5.9(b) shows the variation in minimum glitch magnitude with operating voltage-
frequency for four applications. The Y-axis values are normalized to the minimum glitch
magnitude at the HOP (Section 5.6.2).
It can be noticed that the trend-lines for all the applications monotonically decrease
from HOP towards the lower operating points, reflecting a diminished fault tolerance with
decreasing voltage-frequency. On an average, the lowest operating point in the experiment
is 2.8X more vulnerable to timing fault attacks, compared to the HOP, considering all the
applications. In the experiments, it is observed that a glitch magnitude, as low as 10% of the
supply voltage, can cause a successful fault at the lowest operating point. These results lead
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to a conclusion that a relatively weak stressmark is potent enough to inflict visible faulty
behaviors during an application execution at the NTC operating conditions. Employing a
weak stressmark makes TITAN more stealthy due to an insignificant side-channel. Also,
the drastic impact of PV would likely further degrade the NTC systems’ fault resilience,
thwarting secure operations.
5.6.4 Practical Examples of TITAN
The potential impacts of TITAN are presented in a few real applications, assuming
a majority of the vulnerable instructions in an application encounter timing faults due to
a TITAN. While such timing fault attacks can be performed at STC operating conditions
too, the high impact of PV makes NTC systems particularly susceptible to TITAN (Section
5.2.1). In the following discussion, the first four applications are part of the SPEC CPU
2006 benchmark suite [103]. The results are obtained by instrumenting the GDB driven
architected states during the application execution.
• Corrupted Uncompressed Data in Bzip2: Assuming BRANCH being the vul-
nerable instruction, faults are injected in the branches of the uncompress-stream mod-
ule of Bzip2, which can corrupt the data that is required to get the logical end of
stream. As a result, the uncompressed data fails to validate data integrity, as indi-
cated by the CRC flag of the program.
• Failed Factorization in Libquantum: The Greatest Common Divisor (GCD) unit
in the Shor’s factorization module of Libquantum, has multiple calls to BRANCH
instructions. Considering BRANCH to be the vulnerable instruction, faults are
introduced in such branches which can lead to an incorrect inference (e.g., branch not
taken, as opposed to taken), potentially causing an error in the GCD calculation. The
incorrect GCD computation results in a failed factorization for a composite number.
• Sub-optimal Vehicle Schedule in Mcf: The main Mcf engine uses a primal sim-
plex method to obtain the optimal vehicle schedule. It creates artificial arcs for each
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node. Each arc has a positional attribute with some values. Based on certain con-
ditions, the position of each arc is updated. Once again, considering BRANCH as
the vulnerable instruction, faults are injected in them, so that the program can erro-
neously bypass the check for the aforementioned conditions, resulting in an incorrect
arc position. Such a fault leads to a sub-optimal vehicle schedule, as indicated by the
checksum difference between the fault-free and the faulty execution of the program.
• Erroneous Force Calculation in Namd: The computational core in Namd cal-
culates the movement of the atoms for the patches in the input patch list. Assuming
LOAD to be the vulnerable instruction, faults are introduced in them, and as a result,
the position of a given atom in the patchlist may not be updated. Failing to update
the position of an atom results in a miscalculation of the force, which is reflected by
an incorrect checksum with respect to a baseline execution of the application with no
timing fault.
• Illegal Queen Configuration in N-Queens: This benchmark implements a prop-
agation and backtracking based approach to solve the popular N-queens problem. The
implemented algorithm finds a single legal queen configuration with polynomial time
complexity [104]. The safe check module of the benchmark checks if a queen can be
placed at given row-column pair of the board. If LOAD is assumed to be the vulner-
able instruction, injecting faults in them can cause an incorrect inference by the safe
check module. As a result, it returns an illegal board position as a valid configuration
for the game.
CHAPTER 6
EXPLORING A FOCALLY INDUCED FAULT ATTACK STRATEGY IN
NEAR-THRESHOLD COMPUTING
6.1 Background and Contributions of This Work
Computing is on an upward trend of integrating with humans and our environment
through an interconnected network of wearables, digital dust, smartphones, and desktops.
With this upsurge, two fundamental trends in low power computing are observed that are
poised to reshape the trustworthy properties of future hardware platforms. First, there is a
dramatic rise of low power systems and applications (e.g., Internet of Things (IoT)) that are
systematically intertwined into our mere existence. Many IoT systems, implantable medical
sensors, for example, have stringent constraints on power consumption, while demanding
ever growing computing power and functional diversity. Second, hardware researchers are
actively engaged in exploring a new generation of device and circuit technologies that can
offer massive improvements in the energy efficiency of computation. In this ever-growing
demand for energy efficiency, Near-Threshold Computing (NTC) has emerged as one of the
promising directions [3]. While many recent works have explored the challenges and oppor-
tunities of reliable computing at near-threshold [91], the security vulnerabilities spawning
from such low-power computing frameworks have received only a marginal attention.
NTC circuits feature a tremendous delay sensitivity to supply voltage variation [68],
enabling ample opportunities for timing fault attacks [31]. Recently, Bal et al. have shown
that a small number of process variation (PV) affected logic-gates at NTC, can alter the
critical paths, sensitized during a program execution, which was unprecedented in the realm
of traditional super-threshold computing [105]. Moreover, the PV-induced delay variability
is substantially different in various NTC chips of the same design [68]. Considering these
trends, a threat model is proposed, referred to as a Focally Induced Fault Attack (FIFA),
73
that exploits the circuit-level variability of the NTC systems, to inflict security threats at
the application-level. FIFA employs a machine learning framework to design a malicious
software module. The malicious module, analogous to a polymorphic virus, learns about
the circuit-level vulnerabilities of individual victims—NTC processors—and subsequently
uses the knowledge to launch targeted fault attacks. Specifically, the following are the key
contributions of this chapter.
• A novel threat model, called FIFA, is proposed that exploits the emerging security
vulnerabilities of the NTC circuits to inflict potent timing fault attacks in low-power
mobile platforms (Section 6.2).
• A machine learning framework, called SmartLearn, is developed to identify the circuit-
layer vulnerabilities and generate software modules to cause a breach in security (Sec-
tion 6.3).
• Using the SmartLearn framework, the vulnerable instructions are ascertained for var-
ious NTC chips of the same design (Section 6.5).
6.2 Proposed Threat Model: FIFA
Figure 6.1 illustrates the proposed threat model, FIFA, in the realm of a low-power
mobile platform. FIFA is inspired by a fundamental principle of a viral attack in a biological
system, where the virus is able to mutate itself during its transmission from one human host
to another, thereby vastly improving its efficacy in different hosts with diverse immunities.
Figure 6.1 shows the boundary of trust in FIFA. It is considered that a rogue software
developer will stealthily insert a malware in an application software. This malware learns
the specific vulnerabilities of its victim processor, and subsequently morphs itself to launch
potent fault attacks.
6.2.1 Phases of the FIFA
Three operational phases of FIFA are discussed in order to establish its practicality.
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Fig. 6.1: The Proposed FIFA threat model showing the trusted and untrusted components in a low
power mobile platform.
Malware Insertion
The malware can be inserted in the application software in two different ways. First, a
few rogue application developers can compromise the rigor of the software testing process,
and introduce a malware in the initial release of the software. The malware, with a low
footprint, can efficiently disguise in the statistics collection module of the software that
collects user-approved logs for offline analysis [87]. Second, the initial software release can
be malware-free, but subsequently, it may be tampered through a malicious patch [86]. The
modified application can then launch a FIFA, compromising the integrity of the mobile
platform. Many users download and install updates from untrusted repositories, which
intensifies the scope of a malware insertion through unreliable, malicious patches [106].
Activation
An existing bug in the legacy code of the application software can trigger the malware
by creating a rare event [89]. A covert FIFA can be ensured by using a time-based trig-
ger, similar to the cron job in a Unix based operating system. Moreover, the diverse PV
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signatures of the NTC chips and the corresponding delay characteristics prevent an early
detection of the malware.
Operation
The malware adopts a two-pronged strategy: diagnose and learn the vulnerabilities of
the victim processors, and launch targeted FIFAs exploiting the vulnerabilities.
• Learning Vulnerabilities: Different chips of the same design can have different
delay profiles due to PV, signifying diverse vulnerabilities. The malware comprises
a low-overhead diagnostic module that learns the vulnerable instructions of various
victim processors by inducing timing faults in the victims from the software layer.
The malware uses the popular software-implemented fault injection technique to in-
duce timing faults (details in Section 6.3.3). The malware then offloads the vulner-
able instruction data, consolidated from many victim processors, to a remote server.
Considering multiple remote servers prolongs the eradication of the attack, thereby
fortifying the threat model.
• Launching FIFAs: At the remote server, intelligent machine learning algorithms
are used to identify a small, yet potent, set of vulnerable instructions, that can harm
a large majority of the victim processors. The malware then creates a malicious patch
that launches targeted FIFAs, when installed during a software update process in the
victim mobile phone processors.
6.3 SmartLearn: A Cross-Site Learning Framework
Figure 6.2 illustrates different components of the proposed learning framework—SmartLearn.
SmartLearn aims to automatically learn the vulnerabilities of various chips of a design, to
facilitate a FIFA. Using a cross-site collaborative framework, SmartLearn exchanges infor-
mation between the malicious application server, and the victimized client hardware. The
design challenges of SmartLearn are outlined in Section 6.3.1, and the learning algorithm
is discussed in Section 6.3.2.
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Fig. 6.2: Various operational stages of a FIFA using SmartLearn. Five distinct phases of FIFA are
marked as: (1) vulnerability diagnosis at the chip level; (2) vulnerability data transfer to remote
server; (3) Processing diagnostic data using SmartLearn; (4) Customized malicious patch creation;
and (5) patch delivery to its target chip.
6.3.1 Challenges of SmartLearn
Creating a rogue learning infrastructure faces a couple of unique design challenges,
outlined next.
Colossal Search Space
An attacker needs to retrieve the vulnerabilities of millions of chips of a design, in
order to create a malicious patch, equally detrimental for a majority of the chips. As
the vulnerabilities vary across the chips, designing a potent customized attack for each chip
would extend the search space to mammoth proportions. Hence, it is imperative to optimize
the search space for a few consolidated patches, that would be maximally damaging for the
largest possible share of the chips.
Vulnerability Diagnosis
An effective FIFA design involves an accurate assessment of the hardware-layer vulner-
ability through the software-layer. It is extremely difficult for an application software, to
precisely inject a timing fault in the underlying circuit, crucial for the vulnerability detec-
tion. Moreover, ensuring a stealthy operation requires the malicious software to maintain
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a low activity footprint.
6.3.2 Design of SmartLearn
To overcome the design challenges, SmartLearn employs a holistic Machine Learning
approach, comprising four stages: (a) Software-Induced Fault Generation, (b) Training
Data Accumulation, (c) Machine Learning Model Development, and (d) Patch Formation.
Stage (a), (b) and (c) correspond to step 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 6.2, respectively. Stage (d)
corresponds to step 4 and 5, in Figure 6.2. Each of these stages is described next.
6.3.3 Software-Induced Fault Generation
It is assumed that the vulnerable instructions of a (post-silicon) validated chip cannot
deterministically cause timing violations. This is a reasonable assumption as timing viola-
tions are highly contingent on complex sequencing of opcodes and operands, and determin-
ing such sequences is non-trivial [107]. Hence, the malware needs to create an environment,
that induces timing violations during an instruction execution. In this pursuit, the malware
is instrumented with two distinct categories of instructions, described next.
Fault Inducing Instructions
Bertran et al. have shown that consecutive executions of a sequence of low power con-
suming instructions and a sequence of high power consuming instructions induce a voltage
droop in the power delivery network of the core [90]. Collectively, these two sequences of
instructions are called a stressmark. The induced voltage droop can increase the instruction
delays, potentially causing a timing fault within a pipeline stage [92]. Due to an aggravated
delay sensitivity to supply voltage variation at NTC, the execution of these fault inducing
instruction sequences makes the next few benign instructions in the pipeline vulnerable to
timing errors. Multiple distinct droop levels are considered to enforce a timing error for a
given instruction (Section 6.3.4). Different levels of voltage droop can be precisely generated
at the software level using well-known stressmark generation methodologies [101, 108]. As
the stressmark parameters are ascertained at the remote server, the associated overheads
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do not impact the stealth of the malware.
Vulnerable Instructions
These instructions contain a subset of all the opcodes supported by the ISA of the victim
processor. For a given instruction, the impact of the operand length on the occurrence
of timing errors, is examined. To estimate the vulnerability, each opcode is paired with
operands of varied lengths, and the extent of violations for such pairs are observed. An
instruction is assumed to be vulnerable, only if it latches an incorrect data in the register
file, after the execution of the fault inducing instruction sequence. Identifying the vulnerable
instructions is done in multiple short intervals to maintain the stealth of the malware.
6.3.4 Training Data Accumulation
In the SmartLearn framework, the vulnerable instructions, along with a few metadata,
comprise the features of the training data set. A few features that are studied, are: opcodes,
number of operands, input operand widths, multiple droop levels for fault injection, and the
number of bit flips in the pertinent register file entry. The malware reads the register values
after the execution of the intended instruction, and compares it against the correct stored
values, to infer a timing error. The violated instructions and the aforementioned metadata
are stored in the application’s memory space, in the form of a hash-table. Considering 34
opcodes of the ARM ISA, with each instruction being 32 bits long, and 8-bit entries to
hold the number of bit-flips per instruction for 3 droop levels, the size of the hash-table is
approximately 250 bytes.
6.3.5 Machine Learning Model Development
A machine learning model is developed at the server, to analyze the diagnostic infor-
mation on vulnerable instructions, collected from millions of chips of a given model, and to
create a few code patches that offer potent attacks to a majority of these chips. This work
compares the performances of multiple machine learning algorithms viz., Support Vector
Machine, XGBoost, Naive Bayes classifier and Random Forest, on the training data set.
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The details on features selection, model accuracies and determination of the vulnerable
instructions are discussed in Section 6.5.
6.3.6 Patch Formation
Upon building the model, its accuracy is evaluated using 10-fold cross validation.
Subsequently, the opcodes are ranked based on their inferred vulnerabilities and suitable
operands are determined to create the most vulnerable instructions (Section 6.5.2). These
vulnerable instructions are then included in the malicious patch. The patch, when installed
during a software update process, launches FIFAs in the client hardware.
Note that generating a distinct patch for every chip is not realistic in the proposed
threat model. To ensure a covert operation, the malware collects and offloads only a mini-
mum diagnostic information for each victim, to the remote server (Section 6.3.4). Deploying
customized patches to the appropriate clients requires the signatures of the clients. Trans-
mitting such signatures would incur additional overhead, thwarting the stealth of the FIFA.
Hence, a single consolidated patch is generated, detrimental for a large share of the victim
NTC chips.
6.4 Methodology
The PTM 14-nm technology model cards are customized for HSPICE, to study the
comparative delay distributions for the basic gates at the NTC region [73]. To model
within-die process-variation, the VARIUS-NTV setup is used [68]. The RTL of the execute
pipe-stage of a 32-bit FabScalar generated core is synthesized [82], with the 15-nm Nangate
library [83], using the Synopsys Design Compiler. The operating voltage and frequency at
NTC are assumed to be 0.45V and 250MHz, respectively.
An in-house statistical timing analysis (STA) tool is used to study the timing errors of
all the sensitized paths of the execute stage, for 7 different arithmetic and logic operations
[105, 109]. The operands are chosen to cover a typical range seen during the executions
of real applications. The STA tool uses a library of delay files for the basic gates, at
different operating conditions. The library comprises both PV-affected and PV-free delay
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information for all the gates. The inputs to the STA tool are the synthesized netlist of
a circuit and the input vectors corresponding to the netlist. The input vectors can be
generated from an architectural simulator.
6.5 Experimental Results
This Section presents the vulnerable instructions, along with their relative vulnerabil-
ities, obtained from the proposed machine learning framework—SmartLearn.
6.5.1 Feature Selection
Determining the set of most vulnerable instructions can be categorized as a classifi-
cation problem. For each training instance, a weighted-average of the number of bit-flips
is calculated that are induced by various droop levels during an instruction execution. A
higher weight is assigned to the low-droop induced bit-flips, to signify a more vulnerable
opcode. If the weighted-average is more than a preset threshold value, the instruction is
inferred to be vulnerable. The feature importances method of the Random Forest classifier
(in scikit-learn [110]) is used to abandon the number of operands as a feature due to a very
poor importance. Finally, the opcode type, first operand width and second operand width
are used as the features for training. The training set comprises 100,000 instances.
Classifier Average Accuracy
Random Forest 85.5%
Support Vector Machine 85.4%
Naive Bayes 85.1%
XGBoost 85.5%
Table 6.1: Average accuracies from 10-fold cross validation.
6.5.2 Ranking Vulnerable Instructions
Table 6.1 reports the average accuracies of various classifiers from 10-fold cross vali-
dation, using the scikit-learn Python package [110]. The average accuracies for other folds
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(e.g., 5 to 9) vary within 1% compared to those reported in Table 6.1. Subsequently, the
opcodes are ranked based on their inferred vulnerabilities, using equation 3 in [111]. 7 op-
codes are considered in the experiments. In the decreasing order of vulnerability, the rank
of the 7 opcodes are: AND, MULT, LOAD, ADD, SUB, XOR and OR. It is also found that
a larger operand has a greater contribution to the vulnerability of an instruction. So, it
is concluded that the top ranked opcodes, combined with large operands, are favorable to
launch FIFAs in a large share of chips of the same design.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This dissertation proposes cross-layer design techniques to improve the reliability and
energy-efficiency of modern multi-core systems, while exposing a critical security loophole
of low-power computing. Specifically, the presented works enable a reliable on-chip commu-
nication under a high power supply noise, improve the energy-efficiency of NTC GPUs over
traditional STC ones, and demonstrate a heightened security vulnerability to fault attacks
while moving from STC to NTC operating conditions.
Ensuring a fault-free communication is imperative to the performance and energy-
efficiency of an NoC—the de-facto on-chip communication fabric for contemporary multi-
core systems. Accommodating Moore’s law to house more transistors on a chip has resulted
in a severe reliability concern due to the power supply noise—a leading cause of the faulty
communication in NoCs. This dissertation demonstrates that existing flow-control protocols
and routing algorithms are ineffective in mitigating the voltage noise in an NoC PDN. A
collection of novel flow-control protocols (PAF) and an adaptive routing algorithm (PAR)
is proposed, to improve the peak PSN in NoCs. The best scheme improves the regional
peak PSN by ∼15% and the EDP by ∼12%, with 4.1% average performance overhead, and
marginal area and power footprints.
Near-threshold computing has been touted as an energy-efficient computing paradigm.
Due to the immense opportunity in exploiting the thread-level parallelism, GPUs are pro-
posed as a viable platform for NTC in this dissertation. However, PV-induced delay variabil-
ity can severely undermine the energy-efficiency benefit of NTC GPUs. This dissertation
proposes SwiftGPU—an ingenious GPU design paradigm, to tackle the potential perfor-
mance and energy-efficiency hazards at NTC. SwiftGPU employs SAS, that dynamically
sprints the MLDs based on the dimensions of the GPGPU kernels, as well as, the MLD
usage pattern during the kernel execution. Evaluated with a rigorous cross-layer method-
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ology, SAS achieves an average of ∼15% improvement in energy-efficiency with marginal
hardware overheads, over an ideal PV-free GPU, operating at STC.
While ensuring the quality-of-service under a strict power budget is a first-order design
constraint for low-power devices, the glaring security vulnerabilities that arise from a low-
power operation, necessitate a design-time trade-off for energy efficiency vis-á-vis offered
security. This dissertation uncovers a paradigm shift in the security vulnerability of the
NTC systems, in relation to timing fault attacks. Using a cross-layer methodology, it is
shown that NTC systems are, by and large, more susceptible to timing faults, despite
boasting a larger timing slack compared to the traditional STC systems. A novel threat
model (TITAN) is proposed that can stealthily exploit the security vulnerability of NTC,
to inflict an application-level damage in a low-power system. To demonstrate the efficacy
of TITAN, hardware experiments are performed using off-the-shelf commodities. Based on
two proposed security metrics, (viz., minimum glitch width and minimum glitch magnitude),
the experiments show a 1.6X and a 2.8X deterioration, respectively, in fault resilience of
low-power operation over a traditional super-threshold operation, exposing a tremendous
vulnerability of the NTC systems to TITAN.
Another threat model, called FIFA, is proposed that can also exploit this extreme se-
curity vulnerability of the NTC systems to launch a large scale fault attacks in low-power
mobile platforms. FIFA employs a machine learning framework, called SmartLearn, to iden-
tify the vulnerabilities of many NTC chips of a given design. By learning the vulnerabilities,
FIFA creates software patches to inflict potent timing fault attacks in the victimized chips.
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